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Notes and Comment
Bills and Notes: Banks: Liability for paying raised check.-The case of Commercial Bank of Grayson v. Arden and Fraley, 197
S. W. (Ky.) 95T (1917), raises the question as to whether a drawee of
a negotiable instrument may, under certain circumstances, be a
holder in due course of such instrument. The case was decided under
section 124, chapter gob, of the Kentucky statutes, which corresponds
to section 205 of the New York Negotiable Instrument Law, providing
that, "when an instrument has been materially altered, and is in the
hands of a holder in due course, not a party to the alteration, he may
enforce payment thereof according to its original tenor." The
drawee bank cashed the depositor's checks, which had been fraudulently raised, and the Kentucky court held, in, this action by the
depositor against the bank to recover the money paid out on these
raised checks, that under the Kentucky statute, the bank was liable
only for the difference between the checks as drawn, and as cashed,
holding the drawee bank to be a holder in clue course.
There is a conflict as to whether the payee of an instrument may
be such a holder in due course, as is contemplated by the statute.
At common law the payee could be such a holder in due course,' and
there are supporting dictain the majority of states, including Massachusetts, 2 Maine, 3 New Hampshire, 4 and Arkansas. This rule has
also been adopted by the New York courts in two recent cases.6 The
Iowa case of VanderPloeg v. Van Zuuk,7 is often referred to as sustaining a contrary view. But that case primarily involves the question
of fraud in filling in blank spaces without authority of the makers, and
so is of little force. But Missouri" is the leading state holding the
contrary view, that court holding that the delivery of the paper to the
payee is not a "negotiation" thereof, and hence not within the terms
of this section.
In the principal case, the Kentucky court disposes of the question as
to whether the drawee bank of a check may be such a holder in due
course, by saying, "It is also conceded that the appellant [the drawee
bank] became the holder of the checks in due course." The facts
were that the Second National Bank of Ashland indorsed the checks
to the Citizens Bank of Grayson, which'in turn endorsed them to the
drawee bank. The drawee bank paid them, and charged them to the
depositor's account. From these facts it would seem that the drawee
bank did nothing more than it was bound to do under its agreement
'Armstrong v. American Exchange National Bank, 133 U. S. 433, 453 (1889).
Boston Steel and Iron Co. v. Steuer; 183 Mass. 140, 144 (1903); Thorpe v.
White, 188 Mass. 333, 334 (ioo0); Nadcoual Investment and Security Co. v.
Corey, 222 Mass. 453, 454 (i9I6).
$South Boston Iron Co. v. Brown, 63 .Me. 139 (873).
4
Horn v. Fuller, 6 N. H. 511 (x834).
5
Cagle v. Latne, 49 Ark. 465 (T887).
6Brown v. Brown, 91 Misc. (N. Y.) 220 (1915), a case decided by the New York
City Court; Bergstrom v. Ritz-Carlton Restaurant and Hotel Co., 171 App. Div.
(N. -.) 776 (1916), citing with approval Brown v. Brown, supra.
7135 Iowa 350 (1907).

sLong v. Shafer, I85 Mo. App. 641, 648 (1914); St. Charles Savings Bank v.

Edwards, 243 Mo. 553, 563 (1912).
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with the appellee, its depositor. The checks were addressed to the
bank, and the bank merely charged the depositor's account with the
amount it paid out on the checks. The bank did ntot buy the checks.
The relation between banker and customer is created by their own
contract, under which the banker is bound to honor the customer's
drafts.9 In the case of Crawford v. West Side Bank,'0 the New York
Court of Appeals says, "The relation existing between a bank and its
depositor is, in a strict sense, that of debtor and creditor. * * *
It receives the depositor's funds upon the implied condition of disbursing them according to his order, and upon an accounting is liable
for all such sums deposited, as it has paid away without receiving
valid directions therefor."
At common law, as is seen in the old English case of Hall v. Fuller,"
the drawee bank could charge the drawer of the check with the
original amount thereof, for the court said that the drawer had, before
the alteration of the check, directed the bank to pay such original
amount, and in paying up to that amount the bank did only what it
was authorized to do. This, it seems, was an exception to the general
common law rule that a material alteration in any commercial paper
extinguished the liability of the maker, in that the agreement was no
longer the one into which he had entered.12 And this exception was
also the common law rule in New York. 3 The leading American case
supporting this view of the common law, is Greenfield Savings Bank v.
Stowell,14 Gray, C. J., afterward an associate justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States, writing the opinion. The discussion is
careful and exhaustive, reviewing all the important cases in England
and United States bearing upon the subject, which had been decided
up to that time, 1877.
In an action under section 205 of the New York Act, (in which,
however, the drawer was not involved), the Appellate Term of the
New York Supreme Court 5 held that section 91 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, defining what constitutes a holder in due course,
governs a case under section 205. Section 9i provides that a holder
in due course is a holder who has taken an instrument that is complete
and regular upon its face; who becomes a holder of it before it is overdue, and without notice that it has been previously dishonored, if such
is the case; and who takes it in good faith and for value; and who, at
the time it was negotiated to him, has no notice of any infirmity in
the instrument, or defect in the title of the person negotiating it.
Justice Goff, the next year, in Smith v. State Bank,' 6 a case decided in
9
Bank of the Republic v. Millard, io Wall. (U. S.)
National Security Bank, 107 Mass. 45 (1871).

152, 155

(1869); Carr v.

10ioo N. Y. 50, 53 (1885).
15 B. & C. (Eng.) 7 5 0 (1826).

12Note, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 402.
Susquehanna Valley Bank v. Loomis, 85 N.Y. 207 (1881), citing with approval

13

Hall v. Fuller, supra, note i i.

123 Mass. 196 (1887), holding that a material alteration of a negotiable instrument, without the consent of a party sought to be charged thereon, rendors the
contract wholly void, as against him, even m the hands of one who takes it in good
faith,
and without knowledge or reasonable notice of the alteration.
5

1Elias v. Whitney, 5o Misc. (N. Y.) 326 (19o6).
16104 N. Y. Supp. 750 (1907).
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the Appellate Term of the Siupreme Court of New York, seems to have
taken it for granted that the defendant bank, which was the drawee
of the check, and which cashed the check for the payee, was such a
holder in due course that the bank could charge the drawer's account
according to the original tenor of the check. The plaintiff in the case,
an accomodation endorser, who had been charged by the drawee bank
for the full amount of the check as raised, was allowed to recover the
original amount of the check, he being held liable for the difference
between the amount to which it was raised, and the check as originally
drawn, under section 55 of the New York Act, which makes an accommodation party liable to a holder for value.
The Missouri court, 17 though declaring that the relationship
between a bank and a depositor is ordinarily that of debtor and
creditor, holds, nevertheless, that where there are no funds to the
credit of the maker, who signed the check in blank, the bank paying
the forged paper is to be treated as a bona fide purchaser, and not in
the relation of bank to depositor. This decision is based upon the
fact that there are no funds to the credit of the maker, and certainly
does not go the length of deciding that the bank paying the check of
its depositor is, in all cases, a holder in due course.
It is surprising that there is so little authority on the question.
The text book writers generally, and writers of notes in annotations to
reported cases, as well as judges in their opinions, apparently overlook
the specific question. This is in part due to the fact that cases on the
subject are rare. People generally seem to have taken it for granted
that the Act was intended to allow the drawee bank to charge its
depositor with the original amount of the check, failing to notice that
by the terms of the Act, the only party who can charge the maker or
drawer according to the original tenor of the instrument, is a holder in
due course, and that a drawee bank does not readily fall within the
definition of a holder in due course contained in the Act. Even the
late Dean Ames, in his quite exhaustive criticism of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 8 fails to notice this defect in section 2o5. He
approves of the section as a "judicious change for the better," but
fails to notice that it hardly seems to cover the case of a drawee bank.
It seems obviously just that the drawee bank should be able to
charge the drawer-depositor with the amount of the check according
to its original tenor, for this partial protection to the bank is but giving
effect to the intention of the drawer, and works no hardship upon
him. Perhaps this may be done by giving a strained interpretation
to the definition of a holder in due course or it may possibly be effected
under the provision of the Act to the effect that "In any case not
provided for, in this chapter, the rules of the law merchant shall
govern,"' 19 although in view of the sweeping language used in
section 205 it is difficult to say this case is not provided for by the Act.
It would seem that really there is here a defect in the statute which
should be corrected by amendment.
M. M. Yellen, 'i8.
17

Allen Grocery Co. v. Bank of Buchanan County, 182 S. W. (Mo.) 777 (i916).
1884 Harv. L. Rev. 241.
'9 New York Neg. Instr. Law, see. 7.
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Constitutional Law: Delegation of legislative powers.-The
Optional City Government Law' of New York was upheld as constitutional in the case of Cleveland v. City of Watertown, 222 N. Y. x59
(1917). The act, passed in 194, permits any city of the state of the
second or third class to adopt, providing a majority of the qualified
electors of such city so determine, one of the forms of government set
forth, in place of the one existing under its present charter. The city
of Watertown, a city of the third class, adopted the commission form
of government by a vote of a majority of the electors of the city. A
taxpayer's action was brought to procure a judgment declaring the
law to be unconstitutional, and to restrain the city of Watertown and
its officers from organizing thereunder. It was claimed that the act
was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers to the voters
of the city. The New York Supreme Court 2 decided that the act was
unconstitutional because the legislative power was delegated to the
voters of the city in violation of the Constitution of the State of New
York. 3 It was declared that the act was passed in an uncompleted
state, and left to be completed by the discretion of the city council,4
instead of the discretion of the legislature. The Appellate Division,
with a dissenting opinion by one justice, affirmed the decision of the
Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals reversed these decisions and
upheld the constitutibnality of the law. This court argued that
there was no delegation of the powers of the legislature, but that the
act was complete in itself, and was to take effect only upon the happening of a certain event, namely, the approval of the majority of the
voters of the locality.
Our federal and state constitutions establish governments by representatives of the people,. and not governments directly by the people.
All the powers intrusted to the government, whether state or national,
are divided into three departments, the executive, the legislative, and
the judicial. The functions of each branch of government are vested
in a separate body of public servants, and the separation of powers is a
fundamental theory of our government. 5 The legislative power has
been placed in the hands of the legislature, and that body has no right
to delegate its powers to any other body or authority.'
However an exception has been made to this general rule in the case
of municipalities with regard to local affairs.7 In Eckerson v. City of
1

2Laws

of New York 1914, ch. 444.
Cleveland v. City of Watertown, 99 Misc. (N. Y.) 66 (917).
"The legislative power of this State shall be vested in the senate and assembly."
Art.
4 III, sec. I, Constitution of the State of New York.
Cleveland v. City of Watertown, 179 App. Div. (N. Y.) 954 (917).
5
The Federalist, arts, 47, 48; for sources of this doctrine, see I Montesquieu's
Spirit of Laws 174 (Book XI, ch:. 6); and I Black. Comm., sec. 146 (Lewis's ed.J
OLocke on Civil Government, sec: I42: "The legislative neither must nor can
transfer the power of making laws to anybody else, or place it anywhere but where
the people have." Also Kilbourn v. Thompson, IO3 U. S. 168 (i88o).
7Care and control of highways: People v. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 188 (1863); Village
of Carthage v. Frederick, 122 N. Y. 268 (I89O); People ex rel. Collins v. Ahearn,
193 N. Y.441 (i9o8); City of Buffalo v. Stevenson, 207 N.Y. 258 (5923).
Public
safety and public health: Metropolitan Board of Health v. Heister, 37 N.Y. 661
(1868); -Polinsky v. People, 73 N. Y. 65 (878); People ex rel. Lieberman v.
Vandecarr, 175 N. Y. 440 (1903); City of Rochester v. Macauley-Fien Co., 19q
N. Y. 207 (910); People v. Kaye, 212 N. Y. 407 (1914); Cooley on Constitutional Limitations (7th ed.) 166, with collection of cases from all jurisdictions.
3
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Des Moines,' the court said, "We may concede that the lawmaking
body of the State is not authorized to submit to a popular vote of the
State the question whether or not an act proposed by it shall become
a law. * * * But while this is so, it does not follow by any means
that the lawmaking body may not reserve to the electors of a subdivision of the State-included within the intended scope of operation
of an act designed to have effect upon local government conditionsthe right to determine on popular vote whether or not they will
advantage themselves of the act. If an act in question is complete
in itself, and requires nothing further to give it validity as a legislative
act, it is not vulnerable to attack on constitutional grounds simply
because the limits of its operation are made to depend upon a vote of
the people." Certain governmental and administrative functions
which affect the people of the state as a whole may be delegated to a
municipal corporation as a state agency, to be exercised within its
territorial limits, and the municipality may be empowered to make
ordinances upon the subjects thus committed to it, and such ordinances have the force of law within the territorial limits over which
their jurisdiction extends.9 These local option laws are now always
upheld.10 Various reasons have been given for their validity. Some
are justifiable as police regulations in which it is proper that the local
judgment should control." And the people of certain localities are
peculiarly interested in the particular legislation. They may fairly
be supposed more competent to judge of their own needs than any
central authority. The reference is reasonable and expedient.
It is generally held that legislation may be enacted to take effect
upon a conitingency.? If the act is complete in itself as a law when it
leaves the legislature, requiring nothing to give it validity, it is
immaterial that its operation may be contingent upon the performance of some condition. But it has been held that the contingency
cannot be the vote of the people, as this would be a delegation to the
people of legislative powers. 3 The leading New York case on the
question of delegation of powers is Barto v. Himrod, decided in 1853.
The constitutionality of an act, entitled "An act establishing free
schools throughout the state," was involved. 4 The act did not purport'to be complete upon its face and whether it should ever become
8137
Ia. 452 (19o8).
9

Note 7 Supra; 6 R. C. L. x68, and cases there cited; 12 C. J. 839.
1"People ex rel. Love v. Nally, 49 Cal. 478 (1875); Taylor v. McFadden, 84 Ia.
262 (1892); Stonev. Charlestown, 114 Mass. 214 (873);
Smithy. McCarthy, 56
Pa. 359 (1867); Fallbrook District v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112 (1896).
UErlinger v. Boneau, SI Ill. 94(i869); Commonwealth v. Fredericks, I i9 Mass.
I99 (1875); Bancroft v. Dumas, 21 Vt. 456 (1849).
nStone v. Charlestown, supra, note 1o; Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. 491 (i873);
Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892).

"3Ex parte Wall, 48 Cal. 279 (x874); Weir v. Cram, 37 Ia. 649 (1873); Opinion
of the Justices, i6o Mass. 586 (1894); Brodbine v. Inhabitants of Revere, 182
Mass. 598 (19o3); State ex rel. Pearson v. Hayes, 61 N. H. 264 (i88i); Barto v.
Himrod,
8 N. Y. 483 (1853).
"4 Laws of New York 1849, ch. 140. Certain provisions in it were as follows:
"See. io. The electors shall determine by ballot at the annual election to be
held in November next whether this act shall or shall not become a law."
"Sec. 14.

*

*

* ; and in case a majority of all the votes in the state shall be

cast for the new school law, then this act shall become a law

* * *

"
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a law was left to the electors of the state to say. In his opinion
Ruggles, Ch. J., said:15 "The legislative power in this state is vested
by the constitution in the senate and assembly. The power of passing
general statutes exists exclusively in the legislative bodies. * * *
The exercise of this power by the people in other cases is not expressly
and in terms prohibited by the constitution; but it is forbidden by
necessary and unavoidable implication. The senate and assembly
are the only bodies of men clothed with the power of general legislation." The act was held unconstitutional because on its face it did
not purport to be a law when it came from the hands of the legislature,
but was only to become a law in case it should have a majority of the
votes of the people in its favor. It was the popular vote which made
the law. The legislature merely proposed the law, while the people
passed or rejected it. It was legislation by the people.
Before Barto v. Himrod had been decided, two important decisions
on the same subject had been made in other states.16 In Rice V.
Foster7 the court said that direct legislation by the people was against
the representative system and the republican form of government, and
declared that the natural result of submitting laws to popular vote
would be to "demolish the whole frame and texture of our representative system of government and prostrate everything to the worst
species of tyranny and despotism, the ever varying will of our irresponsible multitude." To the same effect was Parker v. Commonwealth,'8 decided in the same year. There are only two decisions 9
upholding the opposite doctrine, while the weight of authority holds
that in the absence of express constitutional authorization a legislative act cannot be made contingent upon being accepted by a popular
158 N. Y. 483, 488, 489 (1853).
A short review of the later New York authorities may not prove out of place:
In Bank of Rome v. Village of Rome, i8 N. Y. 38 (1858), an act which left to the
voters of a locality to determine whether they desired to have the municipality
subscribe to the stock of a railroad corporation or not, was held to be constitutional. The constitutionality of similar acts was also upheld in Starin v. Town of
Genoa, 23 N. Y, 439 (1861), and Bank of Chenango v. Brown, 26 N. Y. 467 (1863).
People v. Fire Association of Philadelphia, 92 N. Y. 311 (1883), holds that the
legislature might pass statutes to take effect upon the arising of a future contingency. See also Stanton v. Board of Supervisors, 191 N.Y. 428 (i9o8), where the
court recognized the difference between enactments pertaining to the whole state
and those pertaining to localities. In People ex rel. Unger v. Kennedy, 207 N. Y.
533 (I913), an act of the legislature entitled, "An act to erect the county of the
Bronx" was held constitutional, although it contained a provision that the new
county should not be formed, and the act should not become effective until a
majority of the qualified electors of the territory, out of which the proposed county
was to be erected, should vote in favor of it. The court held that the act was
complete when it left the legislature, and the fact that it was for the voters to
determine whether or not they would accept it, did not make it unconstitutional.
Hiscock, J., at page 545, referring to the Barto case, said: "Subsequent decisions
have declared that the doctrine of that case should not be pushed beyond the
question there involved and that the legislature may pass a statute which is a
completed law affecting or conferring rights upon a restricted locality but to
become operative only in the event of an affirmative vote by the people of such
locality."
"GRice v. Foster, 4 Harr. (Del.) 479 (1847); Parker v. Commonwealth, 6 Pa.
507 (1847).
1'Supra,note 16.
18Supra,note 16.
IgState v. Parker, 26 Vt. 357 (1854); Smith v. Janesville, 26 Wis. 291 (1870).
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vote of the state
at large.20 The remarks of Holmes, J., in Opinions
2
"But the question * * * is
of the Justices, ' are interesting:
whether an act of the Legislature is made unconstitutional by a
proviso that, if rejected by the people, it shall not go into effect. If
it does go into effect, it does so by the express enactment of the
representative body. I agree that the discretion of the legislature is
intended to be exercised. I agree that confidence is put in it as an
agent. But I think that so much confidence is put in it that it is
allowed to exercise its discretion by taking the opinion of its principal,
if it thinks that course to be wise."
The legislature is unable to exercise its power over municipal subdivisions of the state without the co-operation of local officers, and in
order to facilitate local administration it is necessary to delegate
powers with respect to local government to designated agents. The
legislature cannot manage all the public interests of a certain locality.
If local legislative power may be conferred upon officials of municipal
corporations as representatives of the people, why not confer certaift
legislative powers upon the electors themselves? As was said in
Locke's Appeal,2 "Can anyone distinguish between committing the
determining power to the authoritiesof the district, and to the people
of the district? If the power to determine the expediency or necessity of granting licenses to sell liquors.in a municipal division, can be
committed to a commission, a council, or a court, which no one can
dispute, why cannot the people themselves be authorized to determine
the same thing?"
The spirit of localized government, by local territorial subdivisions,
found early root and growth in the notions of English liberty. It was
believed to be essential to freedom. From an early period the local
territorial subdivisions of England, such as shires, towns, and parishes,
enjoyed a great degree of freedom and were permitted to manage their
local affairs. Our ancestors brought these notions with them to this
country and they were given an opportunity for free development.
These laws are in accordance with the general theory of our government, that all our laws should be made in conformity to the wishes
of the people.
William E. Vogel, 'ia.
Constitutional Law: Due process: Segregation of prostitutes.An ordinance passed by the City of New Orleans provided that after a
certain date it would be unlawful for any prostitute or woman
notoriously abandoned to lewdness, of the black or colored race, to
occupy, inhabit, live, or sleep in any house, room or closet situated
outside of prescribed limits. Section 2 of the ordinance provided
similarly for those of the white race, with the exception that a different
territory was designated for their segregation. In the case of City of
New Orleans v. Miller et al, 76 So. (La.) 596 (i917), this ordinance was
attacked as outside of the power of the commission council of New
20
2

See note 13, supra.
lSupra, note 13.

2See his dissenting opinion at page 594.
2'72

Pa, 491, 499 (1873).
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Orleans to enact. The defendants were of the colored race, and had
been convicted of a violation of the ordinance. On appeal, they
challenged its constitutionality upon the ground that its enforcement
would deprive them of their personal liberty without due process of
law, and because it was oppressive, discriminatory and unjust, and
upon the further ground that it was ultra vires of the municipal corporation of the City of New Orleans. The court upheld the defendant's demurrer to the affidavit upon which the action was brought,
the theory being that the ordinance did not attempt to regulate
houses of prostitution (express authority to do which was granted by
the city's charter), but regulated the dwelling places of prostitutes by
forbidding them to live outside of the designated portions of the city.
"The right to live in a community," said the court, "is of the very
essence of personal freedom and opportunity that the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution proposes to secure. * * * Each
person in the community has the essential right to live there, and in
such place as he may choose to live, provided he lives there in conformity to the laws of the land, and does not engage in any occupation
in his domicile which is prohibited by law." This right could not be
taken away except by due process, and an ordinance ultra vires of a
municipality is not due process. It seems to be on this ground that
the defendant's demurrer was sustained, and not upon the ground
that the segregation of prostitutes is not constitutionally possible,
while segregation of houses of prostitution is admitted to be con-

stitutional.
Ordinances dealing with this evil are usually aimed at houses of
prostitution rather than at the prostitutes themselves, and it seems
generally conceded that these places of ill-fame may be regulated and
even suppressed entirely.1 But legislation similar to that in the
principal case seems not to have been considered by the courts except
in that case and in the case of L'Hote v. New Orleans,2 decided by the
Supreme Court of the United States. This latter decision is generally
cited in favor of the constitutionality of such legislation. It involved
an ordinance of the City of New Orleans similar to that in the principal case, except that it segregated all prostitutes within the same
territory, making no distinction between blacks and whites. The
plaintiffs in that case were property owners within and adjacent to the
segregation territory, and the ordinance was attacked chiefly upon
the ground that it decreased the desirability of the locality, and
materially impaired the value of the plaintiff's property. The court
held the ordinance constitutional, at least as against the plaintiffs.
But, in considering the effect of this decision upon the question involved in the principal case, and upon the segregation of prostitutes
in general, it is interesting to note, as Mr. justice Brewer pointed out
'Hudson v. Jennings, 134 Ga. 373 (I9O); State v. Botkin, 7 Ia. 87 (1887);

Commonwealth v. Goodall, 165 Mass. 588 (1896); City of St. Ignace v. Snyder,
75 Mich. 649 (i889); Missouri v. Clark, 54 Mo. 17 (1873); Hatcher v. City of
Dallas, 133 S. W. (Tex.) 914 (1911).

2177 U. S. 587 (i9oo).
But see, also, the case of Dunn v. Commonwealth, io5
Ky. 834 (1899), where an ordinance prohibiting prostitutes from being on the
streets and alleys, except in instances of reasonable necessity, between the hours

of 7 P. m. and 4 A. m. was held valid.
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in his opinion, that "no woman of that character is challenging its
validity; there is no complaint by her that she is deprived of any
personal rights, either as to the control of her life or the selection of
an abiding place. She is not saying that she is denied the right to
select a home where she may desire, or that her personal conduct is in
any way interfered with. * * * no person owning buildings
outside of the prescribed limits is complaining that he is deprived of a
possible tenant by virtue of the ordinance, or saying that the abridgment of her freedom of domicile operates to cut down the amount of
his rents." Nevertheless, the tenor of the opinion seems to accept
the view that segregation of prostitutes is a valid exercise of the police
power. In respect to the ordinance involved in the case, the court
remarked, "It attempts to confine their domicile, their lives, to certain territorial limits. Upon what ground shall it be adjudged that
such restriction is unjustifiable; that it is an unwarranted exercise
of the police power? Is the power to control and regulate limited
only as to the matter of territory? * * * At any rate, can the
power to so regulate be denied?"
It is submitted that this is the better view. The Fourteenth
Amendment was not designed to interfere with the power of the state
to prescribe reasonable regulations to promote the health, peace, and
morals of the people.3 It can hardly be questioned that those persons
whose vocations rely for support entirely upon human weaknesses
and passions affect vitally the public health and morality. Legislation of the character in question seldom results, unless conditions
exist which demand it, and the legislative body is usually in a far
better position to determine whether they do exist than the courts.
If prostitution is an evil, and admittedly it is, it would seem that the
means taken to suppress it by the City of New Orleans were not so
clearly unreasonable as to be outside the police power of the state, if
the state itself should act, or should delegate to the municipality the
power to act in this respect.
In view of the recent decision of Buchanan v. Warley,4 the validity
of the provision, contained in the New Orleans ordinance, segregating
the black or colored prostitutes from those of the white race, might
seem to be somewhat doubtful. In the Buchanan case, the Supreme
Court of the United States held that the segregation of races was
unconstitutional. The Louisiana court, in the principal case, implied
that legislation segregating black and white prostitutes would be
valid. The attitude of the Louisiana court is probably explained by
the general leniency of this state in respect to social discriminatibn
between the races. 6 Perhaps, however, a desire to prevent sexual
intercourse between persons of the white and colored races might
justify segregation of prostitutes of the different
races even though
6
the races as a whole cannot be segregated.
W. J. Gilleran, '18.
3Barbier v. Connolly, I 13 U. S. 27 (I885); Jones v. Brim, 165 U. S. I8o (1897).
4245 U. S. 6o (1917). See comment on this case and upon segregation of the
races
in general in 3 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 133.
5
See Marr's Ann. Rev. Stats. of Louisiana, sees. 4768, 5722, 6067 and 6069.
TPace v. Alabama, 1o6 U. S. 583 (1882); State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389 (187).
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Constitutional Law: Police power: Reserved power: Their
relationship.-In People v. Beakes Dairy Company, 222 N. Y. 416
(1918), the Court of Appeals of New York was confronted with the
question of the state legislative power over corporations. The
statute passed upon provided, to use the summary of the court:
"(i) No person, firm, association or corporation shall as a business,
buy milk or cream within the state from producers for the purpose of
shipping the same to any city for consumption or manufacture without
having (a) an established office within the state, and (b) a license.
(2)
No such person, firm, association or corporation may obtain a
license without (a) satisfying the commissioner of agriculture of his
character and financial responsibility; (b) either by giving a surety
company bond of not less than five thousand dollars or more than one
hundred thousand dollars, or making a deposit of money or securities,
or (c) if an individual or a domestic corporation, satisfying the commissioner that he is solvent and possessed of sufficient assets to
reasonably assure compensation to probable creditors.' (3) On
default of payment by a licensee of money due for the purchase of
milk and cream the commissioner shall apply the security to the
extinguishment of the claims of creditors filed with him."
The court dismisses the complaint on a point of pleading, then
proceeds to discuss the constitutionality of the statute, stating that
the state may regulate a business however honest in itself, if it may
become a medium of fraud. But this statute, the court says, has
for its object the collection of debts through the agency of the state;
it points to protection from the probability of financial loss rather than
fraud and goes far beyond any mere licensing statute by requiring
the licensee to give security for the payment of his debts. The question of the validity of the statute under the police power of the state is
not passed upon, but the court says this is a valid exercise of the
reserved power to amend corporate charters.
Among others, two interesting questions are presented by the case
and its decision.. Is the statute a valid exercise of the police power?
If not, what broader right of taking property is there under the
reserved power than under the police power?
Constitutional law is, as the court quotes, "to a certain extent, a
progressive science,"' and "The needs of successive generations may
make restrictions imperative today which were vain and capricious
to the vision of times past." 2 The police power has been held to be
the "least limitable of the powers of government"3 and to embrace
"regulations designed to promote the public convenience orthe general
prosperity, as well as * * * public health, the public morals or
the public safety," and the validity of police regulations "must
depend upon the circumstances of each case and the character of the
regulation, whether arbitrary or reasonable and whether really
designed to accomplish a legitimate public purpose."14
Applying these broad doctrines to the particular question pre'Holden
v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 385 (1898).
2
Klein v. Maravelas, 219 N. Y. 383, 386 (1916).
3
District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U. S. 138, 149 (1909).
4
r-hicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 56I, 592 (I9o6).
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sented here, several cases have been decided which have some analogy.
Perhaps the most interesting of them as bearing upon the present
case are those interpreting two New York statutes. The first provided that all persons, firms or corporations who sell steamship
tickets and also carry on the business of receiving money for the purpose of transmitting the same or the equivalent thereof, to foreign
countries, shall give a bond to the state of fifteen thousand dollars,
conditioned for the faithful holding and transmission of said money,
and that a suit might be brought to recover on the bond by or for any
party aggrieved. This was held within the police power because
fraud had been practiced in such transactions. 6 In the second case
the statute forbids an individual or partnership to engage in the
business of receiving deposits of money for safekeeping or transmission to another, or for any purpose, without a license from the comptroller. To obtain the license the licensee must (x) deposit ten thousand dollars in money or securities, (2) give a bond to the state
conditioned upon faithful holding of money deposited with the
applicant in accordance with the terms of deposit and repayment.
Upon insolvency or bankruptcy of applicant, payment of the full
amount of the bond shall be made to the assignee or receiver for the
benefit of persons making deposits. Such statute was held valid, as
being for the purpose of preventing fraud.6 The court thought
paternal supervision justified here because of the nature of the people
(immigrants) with whom the applicant dealt. The guaranteed bank
deposit cases7 go a step farther and take the property of one bank for
the possible debt of another, the court saying in one case: "* * *
still there is no denying that by this law a portion of its property
might be taken without return to pay debts of a failing rival in
business."" And the Washington Workmen's Compensation Act,
which has recently been held constitutional, provided for compulsory
contribution to a state fund for the compensation of employees who
might be injured with or without the fault of the employers. 9 These
cases uphold under the police power, legislative action which
provides for the compulsory creation of a fund for the payment of
debts or obligations upon the ground that some element of public
welfare is involved, and in the case last cited the statute even creates
new-obligations to be met.This brings us to the present case. Applying the broad doctrines of
the police power as interpreted by these cases, is the statute valid on
that ground? As pointed- out in the dissenting opinion of Kellogg,
P. J., when the case was before the Appellate Division, 0 it is vital to
the welfare of the people of the large cities of the state, whose milk
supply is received largely through these stations, that they should be
supplied with pure and wholesome milk. To reach this result, the
farmers must be induced to produce it. If irresponsible persons or
5

Musco v. United Surety Co., 196 N. Y. 459 (19o9).

6Engel v. O'Malley, 219 U. S. 128 ('9"1).

Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S.

Dolley,
219 U. S. 121 (1911).
8

1o4

Noble State Bank v. Haskell, supra, note 7.

(1911); Assaria State Bank v.

2Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington 243 U. S. 219 (1917).
I0 People v. Beakes Dairy Co., 179 App. Div. (N. Y.) 942 (1917).
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corporations are allowed to conduct these stations and the farmer is to
suffer damage thereby, he will soon be convinced that it is better for
him to limit the production of milk and increase his activities to produce other farm products, or to take his milk to locally conducted
factories for manufacture. Here are, then, two aspects of public
welfare to be served by the statute: (a) that of protection to a large
class of farmers from fraud, and (b) the assuring a sufficient supply of
milk to a larger class of consumers in the cities. The statute does not
compel the giving of a bond except in cases where the individual or
corporation cannot show financial soundness, and where such cannot
be shown, that circumstance seems to justify the requirement. It
does not seem unreasonable to say that the purpose of this statute is
to induce an adequate supply of milk for the cities of the state by protecting the producers from being defrauded of payment for it.
While discussing at length the legislative power and stating that
this statute "goes far beyond any mere licensing statute," yet the
court holds that it is a proper use of the reserved power of the state
over corporations. The court's discussion of the extent and limitations of this power is limited to: "* * * the legislature may not
defeat or substantially impair the object of the grant, the right of the
corporation to transact business, but it may qualify it by reasonable
restrictions."
The corporate charter was early held to be a contract which was
protected by the federal constitution against impairment," but,
nearly all jurisdictions acting on a suggestion in that decision, have
reserved the right to alter, amend or repeal the charter. The effect
of this clause now seems to be to prevent the charter from becoming a
contract which is protected from impairment by the Federal Constitution.u
Since by a charter a corporation is given life by the state and
becomes a "person", under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
it is thereby protected from deprivation of property without due
process, and is guaranteed the equal protection of the laws. Does the
reservation of the power to alter or amend a corporate charter take
away the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, or make that due
process which would not be due process under the police power? The
object of the reservation was early declared to be "to prevent a grant
of corporate rights and privileges in a form which will preclude legislative interference with theirexercise, if the public interest should at
any time require such interference."' 3 And again, "to protect the
rights of the public and of corporators or to promote due administration of the affairs of the corporation."' 14 In another case it was said
it "may be exercised, and to almost any extent, to carry into effect the
original purposes of thl grant * * * ,"15 Its limitations have
"Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 518 (1819).
EState, Morris & Essex R. R. Co. v. Comm'r. of R. R. Taxation, 37 N. J. L. 228
(1874); see also Mr. Justice Bradley in Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, 748
(878), and Cooley, J., in Detroit v. Detroit & Howell P. R. Co., 43 Mich. 140,
147 (1880).

13Tomlinson v. Jessup, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 454 (1872).
"4Holyoke
Co. v. Lyman,
15

15 Wall. (U. S.) 5oo,519 (1872).
Miller v. The State, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 478, 498 (1872).
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been defined as "any alteration * * * which will not defeat or
substantially impair the objects of the grant, or any rights vested
under it, and which the legislature may deem necessary to secure
either that object or any public right."'16 The language in these cases
clearly upholds merely the alteration of the charter privileges and
duties, and not the taking of vested property.
There has been a tendency in recent cases for the courts to talk
about the reserved power in upholding regulative statutes, which
infringe rights of property. Sometimes the legislation is justified on
this ground, sometimes on this ground and on the ground of the police
power. An act requiring a sinking fund for railroad corporations'
indebtedness on bonds and other securities, was held valid because a
protection to a large number of various kinds of investors.17 The
fixing of water rates,18 rates for transportation 9 and street car fares
for school children, 20 were thus upheld because affected with a public
use. A statute requiring street railway corporations to pave between
and outside its tracks, was held valid on the ground that the care of
highways is a public right of great extent.2' A statute prohibiting
persons and corporations from maintaining a school for both white
persons and negroes, was held valid under the reserved power,2' and a
like classification has been held good under the police power.23 A
labor law of New York requiring railroad corporations to pay its
employees semi-monthly and in cash, was held valid by the Supreme
Court of the United States under either power, the court saying:
"Cost and inconvenience * * * would have to be very great
before they could become an element in the consideration of the right
of a State to exert its reserved power or its police power", and speaking
of the decision of the New York court when the case was before it, the
Supreme Court said: "How far the reserved power of the State
*
* * was helped out by its police power, the court gave no
indication."'
A very recent case in the United States Supreme
Court held a statute requiring street railway companies to carry
detectives on duty free of charge, to be a valid exercise of either
power.21 It is submitted, however, that all of the statutes in question
could have been upheld solely upon the police power.
It would seem clear that the reserved power merely prevents the
charter becoming a contract, protected from impairment by the constitution. Under the reserved power, therefore, anything may be
done which could be done if the Federal Constitution did not forbid
impairment of contracts. But if that clause were struck out of the
constitution, the due process and equal protection clauses would be
IsClose v. Glenwood Cemetery, 107 U. S. 466, 476 (1882); see also, Sinking
Fund Cases, supra, note 12.
17
Sinking Fund Cases, supra, note 12.
18
Stanislaus County v. San Joaquin, C. & I. Co., 192 U. S. 201 (1904).
19Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319 (1877).
21San Antonio Traction Co. v. Altgelt, 200 U. S. 304 (19o6).
21
Fair Haven & Westville R. R. Co. v. New Haven, 203 U. S. 379 (19o6).
22Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45 (19Q8).
Plessy v. Ferguson, 16,3 U. S. 537 (1896).
24
Erie R. R. Co. v. Williams, 233 U. S. 685, 700, 698 (1914).
2
5Sutton v. New Jersey, 244 U. S. 258 (1917); see also, N. Y. & N. E. Ry. C9. v.
Bristol, 151 U. S. 556 (x894).
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there, and with these, it is believed that the reserved power has
nothing to do. The following language of Judge Cooley is very clear:
"But there is no well considered case in which it has been held that a
legislature, under its power to amend a charter, might take from the
2
corporation any of its substantial property or property rights."
It is submitted that the court could have held in the principal case
that reasonable men might believe the legislation in question necessary for the protection of the public, and so ought to have refused to
hold the legislation an abuse of the police power, but that when it
supported the legislation on the reserved power, it put the decision on
questionable ground. It is also a matter of regret to the reader of
the opinion that the court did not feel called upon to consider more
fully the extent of this power.
Ralph L. Emmons, 'i8.
Constitutional Law: Taxation: Establishment of a municipal fuel
yard.-In Jones v. City of Portland,38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 112 (1917), the
Supreme Court of the United States dismissed an action brought by
certain citizens and taxpayers of the city of Portland, Maine, to enjoin
the creation of a municipal fuel yard in that city. The legislature of
the state had given the authority to the city to establish the yard if
it so desired.' The city had voted to carry out the project and had
appropriated one thousand dollars for the purpose. The court held
that the taxation for this project was for a public purpose and not a
violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, and
was, therefore, constitutional.
Previous to this decision the authorities on this question were very
scant. The matter of the establishment of public fuel yards and the
constitutionality of state laws and municipal ordinances authorizing
the construction of such yards and appropriating money therefor, had
come up in three states-Massachusetts, Michigan, and Maine. In
2
6Detroit v. Detroit & Howell P. R. Co., supra, note 12. On the same
page the court says again: "But for the provision in the Constitution of the
United States which forbids impairing the obligation of contracts, the power to
amend and repeal corporate charters would be ample without being expressly
reserved. The reservation of the right leaves the State where any sovereignty
would be if unrestrained by express constitutional limitations, and with the powers
which it would then possess. It might therefore do what it would be admissible
for any constitutional government to do when not thus restrained, but it could not
do what would be inconsistent with constitutional principles. And it cannot be
necessary at this day to enter upon a discussion in denial of the right of the
government to take from either individuals or corporations any property which
they may rightfully have acquired." Shaw, C. J., in Commonwealth v. Essex
Co., 13 Gray (Mass.) 239, (1859), said at page 253: "Perhaps- * * * the
rule to be extracted is this: that where, under power in a charter, rights have
been acquired and become vested, no amendment or alteration of the charter
can take away the property or rights which have become vested under a legitimate exercise of the powers granted." The same conclusion is reached in Lake
Shore & M.S. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 173 U. S.684,69o (1898), citing the two above
cases. At page 698 the court said: "The power to alter or amend does not
extend to the taking of property of the corporation either by confiscation or
indirectly by other means." See also Cullen, C. J., in Ivesv. South Buffalo Ry.
Co., 2oi N. Y. 271, 319-32o (iis), and Field: J., in Spring Val. Water Wks. v.
Schottler,
HO U. S.347, 368 (x883).
1
Revised Statutes of Maine, chap. 4, see. 87; "Any city or town may establish
and maintain, within its limits, a permanent wood, coal, and fuel yard, for the
purpose of selling, at cost, wood, coal, and fuel to its inhabitants. The term 'at
cost' as used herein, shall be construed as meaning without financial profit."
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and again in

39o3,3

the Justices of the highest court of Massa-

chusetts advised the legislature of that state that the establishment of
public fuel yards, with the idea that they should be at all permanent,
would be unconstitutional. The remarks of the Michigan court in
Baker v. City of GrandRapids,4 while they were largely obiter and not a
necessary or controlling factor in the case, were, nevertheless, in
accord with the opinion of the Massachusetts court. The Maine
court, in Laughlin v. City of Portland,5 took the opposite view and held
that the establishment of these fuel yards was in every 'vay constitutional.
The view of the Supreme Court of the United States and of the
Maine court would seem to be the one which is more in accord with
modem economic ideas and tendencies and with sound public policy.
The decision in the principal case is, furthermore, based upon well
recognized principles of constitutional law. The Supreme Court
points out that "the decision of the case turns upon the answer to the
question whether the taxation is for a public purpose." It is hard to
see any validity in a contention that, under present wartime conditions
at least, the distribution of fuel is not such a public purpose.
Harry H. Hoffnagle, '17.
Contracts: Assignability.-In Little Co. v. Cadwell Transit Co.,
163 N. W. (Mich.) 952 (1917), the facts were that the B. & 0. Sand,
and Gravel Company and the defendant made a contract, to continue
during the navigation season, whereby the defendant company
which was the owner of a vessel, was to carry sand and gravel in such
quantities as might be required up to the capacity of the vessel.
Payments were to be made on the twelfth of each month for the
quantities delivered -during the previous month. As security for
payment, the B. & 0. Company was, at the request of the defendant,
to assign any contract made by the B. & 0. Company for the sale of
the sand and gravel being carried by the defendant. In the course of
performance, the B. & 0. Company contracted with the Superior
Company to sell that company all the sand and gravel which the
defendant company was to deliver to the B. & 0. Company. This
contract, together with the principal contract, was assigned by the
B. & 0. Company to the Little Company on the same day. Both the
Superior Company and defendant company were at once given notice
of the assignments, but refused further performance on the ground
that the contract was not assignable. It was held by a-divided court
that the contract was assignable.
The essence of the prevailing opinion was that the personal element
was lacking, the court being of the opinion that it could make no
difference to the defendant whether the sand and gravel were furnished by the B. & 0. Company or by the plaintiff; that the plaintiff
took the contract subject to the liabilities of its assignof, and the
defendant could require an assignment to it of the contract made by
the B. & 0. Coripany with the Superior Company as security for
payment .to be made to the defendant company; that there was no
claim that the Little Company was less responsible than the B. &0.
2
Opinion of the Justices, 155 Mass. 598 (1892).
3
Opinion of the Justices, 182 Mass. 605 (1903).
4i42 Mich. 687 (19o6).
5111 Me. 486 (1914).
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Company and by assigning the contract the B. & 0. Company was
not released from its performance.
The case chiefly relied on was Northwestern Lumber Co. v. Byers,'
where the rule was laid down that if "an executory contract is not
necessarily personal in its character, and can, consistent with the
rights and interests of the adverse party, be * * * executed as
well by an assignee as by the original contractor, and * * * the
latter has not disqualified himself from a performance * * * it is
assignable."
The dissent relied upon Boston Ice Co. v. Potter,2 where the defendant had purchased ice from the plaintiff, but being dissatisfied made a
contract with the Citizens' Ice Company for a supply of ice. The
latter's business was bought out by the plaintiff company, which
delivered ice to the defendant, who was not notified of the change
until after the delivery and consumption of the ice. This case, however, is not in point. So far as the report shows, the case was one of
mistake and not one of assignment. No assignment of the vendor's
contracts was made, but merely a sale of the vendor's business. 3
The decision of the principal case seems to state the present law
upon this confused subject. 4 As was held in a New York case, if the
promisor could not object to performance by a bonafide agent of the
assignor, he should not be allowed to object to performance by an
assignee merely because he possesses an interest in connection with
his power as agent.5 But it is obvious that the rule is different, and
that performance of a contractual duty is not even delegable, when
the performance involves personal trust or confidence.8 Of course in
all these cases of assignment, where duties are delegable the assignor
remains ultimately liable. An assignment which purports 7 to divest
an assignor of his ultimate responsibility is not permissible.
In the, principal case, the rights of the contract were assigned and
the duties were delegated to the plaintiff. Here the duties did not
the decision
involve the element of trust and confidence, and hence,
8
of the Michigan court was clearly correct on principle.
Charles Warren Little, '20.
"1133 Mich. 534, 538 (I9O3).
2123 Mass. 28 (1877).
3

However, Professor Costigan, writing in 7 Col. L. Rev. 32, regards the case as
one of assignment.
For a very admirable review of the cases and principles of the law of assignability of contracts, see Professor Woodward's article in 18 Harv. L. Rev. 23.
6Devlin v. Mayor, 63 N. Y. 8 (1875); Liberty Wall Paper Co. v. Stoner Wall
Paper Co., 59 App. Div. (N. Y.) 353 (19Ol), affirmed 17o N. Y. 582 (1902);
Lantern Co. v. Stiles and Parker Press Co., 135 N. Y. 209 (1892).
Rochester
6
Kemp v. Barselman [19o612 K. B.,6o4; Hays v. Willo, 4 Daly (N. Y. C. P.)
259 (1872), where it was held that the manager of a contortionist could not assign
his contract; Arkansas Valley Smelting Co. v. Belden Mining Co., 127 U.S. 379
(1888), where the vendee-assignor had, after the title passed to him by his vendor,
the right to assay ore delivered by the vendor, upon which assay the price to be
paid was to be calculated. The court held that personal confidence and trust
were involved and that the duties of the vendee were not even delegable.
7
Even though a period of credit is given, yet the contract may be assigned, if it
is of such a nature that the assignor need not perform in person. Liberty Wall
Paper Co. v. Stoner Wall Paper Co., supra, note 5.
8
Devlin v. Mayor, supra, note 5. Tolhurst v. Portland Cement Mfrs., [19o]
A.C.414;Cooperv.Mickelfield Coal & Lime Co., 107 L. T. Rep. (N.S.) 457 (1912).
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Contracts: Unilateral or bilateral: Employment contract partly
performed.-In the recent case of Wood v. Lady Duff Gordon, 222 N. Y
88 (ipr7), the defendant was a well known "creator of fashions"
whose approval on the works of other manufacturers is of monetary
value, while her own work has an enhanced value. Plaintiff, who was
in the business of marketing such indorsements, was given the
exclusive right, for one year, to place indorsements of defendant on
the designs of others, subject to her approval, and to market her own
creations. He was to take out all patents, copyrights, or take any
other steps necessary to protect defendant's interests, and was to
render monthly accounts to the defendant of all money received by
him as the result of such exclusive privileges, and pay to her one-half
the profits. Defendant placed her indorsement on the work of
another without plaintiff's knowledge or consent and he sued for
breach of contract. Defendant denied liability because of lack of
mutuality of obligation, asserting that the plaintiff had merely
accepted the exclusive privilege granted him but had not promised on
his part to make any effort to obtain contracts, place defendant's
endorsements, or do other acts. The court refused to take this view
and concluded that this was a bilateral contract with mutual promises,
the promise of plaintiff to use reasonable efforts being implied from
the whole context of the contract, Cardozo, J., saying that "the law
has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise word
was the sovereign talisman and every slip was fatal. * * * A
promise may be lacking and yet the whole writing may be 'instinct
with an obligation" imperfectly expressed."
This case raises the question, are courts to enforce a contract
unilateral in form as unilateral and permit one side to withdraw before
completion of the act called for, to the hardship and injury of the
other party who has been depending in good faith on performance?
According to strict principle, a contract unilateral in form imposes an
obligation on one side only and does not become binding until the act
called for is completed. Until then either side may withdraw. The
hardship to one party which must in this way result at times was
recognized by Chief Judge Gibson, but he says, "it is his folly not to
guard against it by exacting a mutual engagement instead of making
a conditional one which leaves the party employed to earn the
promised reward or not, at his pleasure."'2 Professor Langdell also
recognized the possible "great hardship and practical injustice," but
his solution is similar: let parties make bilateral contracts by mutual
promises and failing in this "any hardships they may suffer should be
left at their doors." 3 Correct though this may be on principle when
enunciated in dictum or stated in a text book, it is quite a different
matter when the actual case comes up for decision. In the face of
hardships presented, the courts by one method or another, based more
or less on legal principle, have found some way of evading the rigid
conclusions of Gibson and Langdell.
'Quotation from Judge Scott's opinion in McCall Co. v. Wright, 133 App. Div.
(N. Y.) 62 (1909).
2Clark v. Russel, 3 Watts (Pa.) 213 (1834).
3Langdell, Contract, pp. 3, 4.
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In a Wisconsin case4 the defendant had made an offer of a promise
in return for an act and just before the completion of the act had withdrawn the offer. The withdrawal worked special hardship and the
court said that persons making offers "cannot arbitrarily withdraw
their offers for the purpose of defeating payment when to do so would
result in the perpetration of fraud." As there was no evidence of
deceit in the case the statement of the court appears to mean it will
not permit an unconscientious and unfair revocation of an offer
where hardship will result to the offeree because of acts done in reliance
upon the offer.
The California Supreme Court managed to arrive at an equitable
solution in a different manner. In Los Angeles Traction Co. v. Wilshire' the court said that "it would be manifestly unjust [after the
plaintiff had begun performance] to permit the offer that had been
made to be withdrawn. The promised consideration had been partly
performed and the contract had taken on a bilateral character." It
is clearly abandonment of legal principle to say that an offer to make
a unilateral contract may by partial performance by the offeree take
on a bilateral aspect and that by some strange means, an offer of a
promise for an act is thus changed to a promise for a promise. The
reason for the statement may be found in the words of the court, that
to do otherwise would be "manifestly unjust."
Another way of solving the problem is found in New York in the
instant case, and without departing from legal principle. The whole
contract is to be considered. Explicit mutual promises may be lacking but mere form is immaterial. It is a question of intent as gathered
from the reading of the entire instrument. If the intention of the
parties and the consideration on which the Obligation is assumed is
that there shall be a correlative obligation on the other side the law
will find one, though not expressed. In the principal case the court
points out that, first, plaintiff was granted an exclusive agency which
would of itself imply a promise of reasonable efforts to fulfill the purpose of this agency. Secondly, the plaintiff was to submit monthly
reports of contracts made, and receipts, and turn over half the profits;
that the meaning of this is that the plaintiff must make efforts, in
order to have something to report about and make profits to have
some to divide; that such conditions were put in for a purpose and
contracts must not be construed so as to deprive them of a legal meaning. Thirdly, the plaintiff was to take all necessary steps to protect
the rights of himself and defendant. The conclusion of the court,
therefore, from a careful analysis of all the facts is that it was the
evident intention of both parties that correlative obligations should
be assumed; the whole contract was "instinct with obligation," and
4
Zwolanek v. Baker Co., 15o Wis. 517 (1912). Plaintiff was in the employ of
defendant who had offered a share of the profits to any one who shall have been in
the regular employ of the company for 4500 consecutive hours during Ioo consecutive weeks provided he was in their employ on Jan. i. Plaintiff who met all the
other conditions was discharged on Dec. 30.
5135 Cal. 654 (1902). Defendant agreed to pay the traction company a sum on
the competion of its line to a certain point. The company purchased a franchise
and did considerable work, but before completion defendant withdrew his offer.
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the explicit promise lacking, was part of the contract by implication. 6
To discover the intended mutuality may sometimes require the
keenest search for the evidence of it, but if the end sought is equitable,
the search is likely to be rewarded. Such efforts may be merely
another "ingenious attempt" characterized by Professor Langdell as
without principle to rest upon. Yet it is submitted that it is in keeping with the present tendency away from "formalism and strict precision, when every slip was fatal," and reaches by a sounder process
of argument the equitable results sought by the Wisconsin and
California courts.
Benjamin Pepper, '20.
Corporations: Liability on promoters' contracts.-There has been
a great deal of litigation involving the question as to when, under
what circumstances, and by what legal theory, a corporation may be
bound by contracts made by its promoters or organizers before its
incorporation. The question recently arose in Morgan v. Bon Bon
CO., 222 N. Y. 22 (1917), in which the promoters of the defendant
corporation, before its organization, made a contract with the plaintiff
for services to be rendered by him for the corporation after its incorporation. After the corporation was organized, the plaintiff performed for it the services with the knowledge and apparent approval
of the officers, who had been promoters and were fully cognizant of
the terms of the contract. In an action against the corporation for
damages for breach of contract, it was held that there was sufficient
evidence for the jury to find that the corporation had adopted the
contract and had become bound by its terms.
In the first place, the authorities seem to be substantially in accord
that promoters, though they purport to act for and on behalf of the
projected corporation and not for themselves, cannot be treated as
agents, because the nominal principal is not then in existence; and
hence, when there is shown nothing more than a contract by the pro.
moters in which they undertake to bind the future corporation, such
6

1n England the same solution was applied in M'Intyre v. Belcher, 14 C. B.
(N. S.) 653 (1863). The plaintiff, a physician, sold his practice to the defendant
for a percentage of his receipts during the succeeding four years. The court held
this contract not to be lacking in mutuality but that a promise on the part of the
defendant to remain and continue in practice was implied.
Cases in which the granting of exclusive agency has been held to raise an
implied promise by the agent to use reasonable efforts are: Baker Transfer Co.
v. M. R. & I. M. Co., i App. Div. (N. Y.) 507 (1896); Phoenix Hermetic Co. v.

Filtrine Mfgr. Co., 164 App. Div. (N. Y.) 424 (1914); City of New York v. Paoli,
202 N.Y. i8 (1911); Mueller v. Mineral Spring Co., 88 Mich. 39o (189i); Taylor
Co. v. Bannerman, 120 Wis. 189 (1904).

Another well defined class of cases in which mutuality will frequently be
implied is dmployment contracts: McCall v. Wright, supra, note i; Moran v.
Standard Oil Co., 211 N. Y. 187 (1914); Geringer v. Friedman, 8o Misc. (N. Y.)
Fuller & Co. v. Schrenk, 58 App. Div. (N. Y.) 222 (I9OI), aff'd.
without opinion 171 N. Y. 671 (1902).
212 (1913);

There are cases where the courts have found it impossible or undesirable to
imply mutuality, e. g., in Rafolovitz v. American Tobacco Co., 73 Hun (N. Y.) 87
(1893), and in C. & G. E. R. R. Co. v. Dane, 43 N. Y. 240 (1870).
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contract cannot be enforced against the corporation.' It must be
noted that under such circumstances the promoters themselves are
liable on the contract, unless it is agreed that the corporation alone
shall be liable, for it is a well recognized principle of the law of agency
that one who professes to make a contract as 2agent for a principal
that has no existence is himself liable thereon.
But how can a corporation, after its organization, become bound by
a contract made by its promoters? First, it has sometimes been
held that a corporation can "ratify" a contract made by its promoters3.
But this view is unsound, if ratification be used with the ordinary
technical meaning which it bears in the law of agency. A ratification,
properly so-called, implies and presupposes a principal existing at the
time of the agent's action, on whose behalf the contract is made at
that time. Therefore, it is generally held that there can be no technical ratification of a contract made before the corporation had existence.4 It follows that since the promoters are in no true sense the
agents of the corporation and si ce the corporation cannot ratify a
promoter's contract, the corporation cannot be held liable upon such
contracts on any principle of the law of agency.
There is another theory, however, under which a corporation may
be held liable upon such a contract, i. e., by an adoption of the contract made by the promoters.5 The term "adoption" may be said
to connote two different theories, viz., (i) the making
of a new con6
tract theory, and (2) the continuing offer theory.
In England and Massachusetts the doctrine of the first theory of
adoption is strictly enforced, and the making of a new contract on
1
Weiss v. Arnold Print Works, 188 Fed. 688 (911); In re Ballou, 215 Fed. 8io
(x9'4); Kelner v. Baxter, L. R. 2 C. P. (Eng.) 174 (1866); Moore & Handley
Hardware Co. v. Towers Hardware Co., 87 Ala. 2o6 (I888); Morrison v. Gold
Mt. G. M. Co., 52 Cal. 3o6 (1877); Park v. Modem Woodmen of America, i8i
I1. 214 (1899); Carey v. Des Moines Coal Co., 8I Ia. 674 (189i); Bradshaw v.
Knoll, 132 La. 829 (1913); Tuttle v. Tuttle, ioi Me. 287 (I9O6); Munson v. S.,
G. & C. R. R. Co., io3 N. Y. 58 (1886); Martin v. Remington-Martin Co., 95 App.
Div. (N. Y.) 18 (1904); Bond v. Atlantic Terra Cotta Co., I37 App. Div. (N. Y.)
671 (i9io); Tift v. National Bank, 141 Pa. 55o (18gi); Weatherford, etc., Ry.
Co.
v. Granger, 86 Tex. 350 (1894); Buffington v. Bardon, 8o Wisc. 635 (189).
2
Kelner v. Baxter, supra, note i; Harrill v. Davis, 168 Fed. 187 (19o9); Carmody v. Powers, 6o Mich. 26 (1886); Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Crawford, 127
Mo. 356 (1894); Roberts Mfg. Co. v. Schlick, 62 Minn. 332 (1895); Weatherford,
etc., Ry. Co. v. Granger, supra,note I; Huffcut, Agency (2d ed.), p. 233.
3
Whitney v. Wyman, 1oI U. S. 392 (1879); Kline Bros. & Co. v. Royal Ins. Co.,
192 Fed. 378 (i9ii); In re Quality Shoe Shop, 212 Fed. 321 (1914); Stanton v.
N. Y. & E. R. R. Co., 59 Conn. 272 (1890); Cushion Heel Shoe Co. v. Hartt, 181
Ind. 167 (1914); Oakes v. Cattaraugus Water Co., 143 N. Y. 43o (1894); Central
Trust
Co. v. Lappe, 216 Pa. 549 (1907).
4
Kelner v. Baxter, supra, note i; In re Empress Engineering Co., 16 Ch. Div.
(Eng.) 125 (I88O); McArthur v. Times Printing Co., 48 Minn. 319 (1892);
Weatherford, etc., Ry. Co. v. Granger, supra, note i; i Machan, Corporations,
p. 283; 1 Morawetz, Corporations (2d ed. ), p. 522; see also dissenting opinion
in 5Oakes v. Cattaraugus Water Co., supra, note 3.
1n re Ballou, 215 Fed. 81o (1914); Bloom v. Home Ins. Co., 121 S. W. (Ark.)
293 (1909); Smith v. Parker, x48 Ind. 127 (1897); McArthur v. Times Printing
Co., supra,note 4; Oakes v. Cattaraugus Water Co., (dissenting opinion), supra,
note 3; Pittsburg, etc., Mining Co. v. Quintrell, 91 Tenn. 693 (892); Weatherford, etc., Ry. Co. v. Granger, supra, note iE; Richardson v. Graham, 45 W. Va.
134
(x898).
6
See I Machan, Corporations, p. 284.
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the terms of the pre-incorporation contract is the only method of
rendering the corporation liable to the third party who has dealt with
the promoters.7 There must be all the requisites of a valid contract
between the corporation and the third party, i. e., offer and acceptance, meeting of the minds, consideration, etc. Under this theory a
mere unilateral act of the corporation, such as a formal confirmation or
adoption of the contract will not constitute a contract between the
corporation and the third party, because there is no meeting of the
minds and no consideration moving to the corporation. 8 The new
contract, necessary under this theory, may be worked out upon the
principle of a novation, i. e., the corporation makes a promise to the
third party in consideration of his releasing the promoters from their
liability on the pre-incorporation contract.
Generally in the United States, when it is said that a corporation
may adopt a pre-incorporation contract so as to be bound thereby,
according to the continuing offer theory it is meant that when the
third party makes a contract with the promoters on behalf of the
corporation to be formed, there is a continuing offer on his part to
enter into a like contract with the corporation when incorporated; 9
if the promoters are by the contract made exempt from liability
thereon, the offer of the third party is naked until accepted by the
corporation; if the promoters are liable, the offer of the third party,
in theory, may be to substitute the corporation in the place of the
promoters by novation. 10 Under this American theory of continuing
offer, any unilateral action on "thecompany's part, communicated to
the third party, evincing a desire to abide by the contract would
amount to'an acceptance of the offer, and therefore complete the
formation of a new contract. Thus, under either the English or
American theory, adoption, in the final analysis, means a contract on
the terms of the old one. The English theory requires proof of a new
offer and acceptance; the American theory requires proof only of an
acceptance.
It is often stated that in England a corporation cannot "adopt" a
contract made by its promoters before its incorporation, but that the
corporation must enter into a new and original contract," apparently
71n re Empress Engineering Co., i6 Ch. Div. (Eng.) 125 (I880); In re Northumberland Hotel Co., 33 Ch. Div. (Eng.) 16 (1886); Spiller v. Skating Rink Co.,
7 Ch. Div. (Eng.) 368 (1878); Abbott v. Hapgood, I5o Mass. 248 (1889); Koppel
v. Mass. Brick Co., 192 Mass. 223 (19O6), in which it was said that a corporation
cannot ratify a promoter's contract, but that the corporation can be bound by
introducing into the transaction such elements as would be a sufficient foundation
for a new contract.
8In re Northumberland Hotel Co., supra, note 7; Gunn v. L. & L. Ins. Co., 12
C. 9B. (n. s.) (Eng.) 694 (1862); In re Dale & Plant, 61 L. T. (Eng.) 2o6 (1889).
Gent v. Manf. & Merchants' Ins. Co., 107 Ill. 652 (1883); Penn Match Co. v.
Hapgood, 141 Mass. 145 (1886); Holyoke Envelope Co. v. U. S. Envelope Co.,
182 Mass. 171 (1902); Omaha Loan &Trust Co. v. Goodman, 62 Neb. 197 (901);
Weatherford, etc., Ry. Co. v. Granger, supra,note I; Pratt v. Oshkosh Match Co.,
89 Wisc. 406 (x895).
"That novation is the apparent theory, see Harrillv. Davis, 168 Fed. 187 (19o9).
"Clark, Corporations (3d ed.), p. I31; 3 Cook, Corporations (7th ed.), p. 2416;
Abbott v. Hapgood, supra, note 7, in which it was said that a corporation cannot
become a party to a promoter's contract, even by adoption or ratification of it.
But in Spiller v. Skating Rink Co., supra, note 7 , it was said that the corporation
could become bound by adoption.
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drawing an analogy to the English rule that a third person cannot sue
on a contract made for his benefit and that corporations cannot
become privy to such a contract made for its benefit by adoption.
This is doubtless on the theory that adoption is not the making of a
new contract; but, as we have seen, under any view of adoption a
new contract must be made.
Under either theory of adoption, the evidence sufficient to establish
adoption is that which would be sufficient to establish a new contract. Thus adoption may be either by express act or by implication
from acts of the corporation which tend to indicate that it has made
such contract its own.'2
The circumstance most often seized upon as evidence of adoption
is the acceptance by the corporation of the benefits of the contract.
The voluntary acceptance of the benefits of the promoters' contract is
indeed strong evidence to establish a contract by the corporation on
the same terms and, accordingly, it is generally held that where the
corporation after its organization, with full knowledge of all the facts,
enters into the enjoyment of such contract or receives the benefits
accruing thereunder, the corporation will be held liable as upon an
original contract, on the ground that it cannot accept and retain the
benefits of the contract of its promoters without taking upon itself
the burdens and liabilities thereof. 13 This is, in effect, equivalent to
holding that acceptance of the benefits, with full knowledge of all the
facts, is conclusive evidence of adoption, or, as is sometimes said,
such acceptance of benefits is adoption by estoppel. 14 The principal
case is an example of liability by acceptance of benefits.
But there are some limitations upon this rule of acceptance of benefits which must be noted. In a leading Texas case15 it was held that
if promoters agree that if a bonus is raised, the railroad will run
through certain places, by accepting the bonus the company becomes
bound to carry out the contract. But if the promoters agree to pay a
person for procuring the bonus, the company does not become liable
to make payment for the services by receiving the bonus, since the
contract for services was no part of the contract, the benefits of which
were accepted. This is, in effect, a decisionthat acceptance of benefits
does not render the corporation liable on the contract unless the
32Smith v. Parker,
supra, note 5; Belfast v. Belfast Water Co., 115 Me. 234
(1916); McArthur v. Times Printing Co., supra, note 4; Furniture & Carpet Co.
v. Crawford, supra, note 2; Hall v. Herter Bros., 83 Hun. (N. Y.) 19 (1894),

aff'd
13 in 157 N. Y. 694; Battelle v. N. W. Cement Co., 37 Minn. 89 (1887).
Moore & Handley Hdwe. Co. v. Towers Hdwe. Co., supra, note i; Smith v.
Parker, supra, note 5; Belfast v. Belfast Water Co., supra, note 12; Apartment
House Co. v. Glenn, io8 Md. 377 (x9o8); Esper v. Miller, 131 Mich. 334 (1902);
Battelle v. N. W. Cement Co.; supra, note 12; Mulverhill v. Railway, etc., Co.,
88 Miss. 689 (196o); Paxton Cattle Co. v. First National Bank, 21 Neb. 621
(1887); Low v. Conn. etc., R. R. Co., 45 N. H. 370 (1864); Bommer v. Am. Spiral,
etc., Hinge Mfg. Co., 81 N. Y. 468 (188o); Davis v. Valley Elec. Light Co., 6r
N.Y. Supp. 580 (1899); Thistle v. Jones, 45 Misc. (N. Y.) 21 5 (1904); Schreyerv.
Turner Flouring Co., 29 Ore. I (1896); Weatherford, etc., Ry. Co. v. Granger,
supra, note i; Chilcott v. Wash. State Colonization Co., 45 Wash. 148 (19o6).
"Belfast v. Belfast Water Co., supra,note 12; Grape Sugar, etc., Co. v. Small,
4o Md. 395 (1874). See also 5o L. R. A. (N. S.) 979, 984.
"Weatherford, etc., Ry. Co. v. Granger, supra,note i; and for a like distinction,
see Hecla Consolidated Gold Mining Co. v. O'Neill, 19 N. Y. Supp. 592 (1892).
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corporation has direct dealings with the third party. It has also been
held that adoption will not be implied from the acceptance of benefits
where the acceptance of the benefits is without knowledge on the part
of the corporation of the terms of the promoters' contract,"6 nor unless
the original contract was made with intent that the corporation
should become bound. 7 But doubtless the prospective corporation
is ordinarily looked to, as well as the promoters personally.
Many courts have used the terms "ratification" and "adoption"
interchangeably and have regarded them as equivalent or synonymous, without thoroughly analyzing the two terms.' 8 These courts
have said that a corporation can ratify or adopt its promoters' contracts. But ratification is impossible, as we have seen, for there was
no existing principal when the contract was made. But in most of
the cases which have held that a corporation can ratify, 9 or can
ratify or adopt,20 there has been no occasion to sharply distinguish
between ratification and adoption. But this distinction may some21
times become very important. In McArthur v. Times PrintingCo.,
the question arose as to whether the contract was one which by its
terms was not to be performed within one year from the making
thereof, and therefore required to be in writing by the Statute of
Frauds, and this question depended upon the time the corporation
became bound by the contract which had originally been made
by its promoters. It was held that the corporation had adopted the
contract, and that by thus adopting, it had made a new contract as of
the time of the adoption and that therefore the contract was not within
the Statute of Frauds. If the principles 'of ratification had applied,
the corporation would have been bound from the date of the making
of the contract by the promoters, instead of from the date of adoption,
and the contract would have been within the Statute of Frauds. At
least one case which held that a corporation can ratify a contract made
by its promoters has also held that the corporation becomes bound
from the date the contract was made.2
The New York courts have likewise fallen into the loose practice of
using the terms "ratification" and "adoption" as equivalent and
synonymous. This resulted from the opinion in the case of Oakes v.
CafaraugusWater Co.,2 where it was stated, without any analysis of
the question or citation of duthorities, that ratification and adoption
meari the same thing. The dissenting opinion of Judge Gray very
carefully pointed out the distinction between ratification and adop' 6Rideout v. National Homestead Ass'n., 14 Cal. App. 349 (191o); Teeple v.
Hawkeye Gold Dredging Co., 137 Ia. 206 (19o8); Pitts v. Steele Mercantile Co.,
75 Mo. App. 221 (1898).
17Perry v. Little Rock, etc., R. R. Co., 44 Ark. 383 (1884); Davis & Rankin
Bldg. Co. v. Hillsboro Creamery Co., io Ind. App. 42 (1893); Tryber v. Creamery Co., 67 Kans. 489 (1903); Davis v. Ravenna Creamery Co., 48 Neb. 471, 478
(i896).
18Park v. Modern Woodmen of America, 18i Ill. 214 (i899Y Furniture &
Carpet Co. v. Crawford, 127 Mo. 356 (1894); Oakes v. Cattaraugus Water Co.,
143 N. Y. 43o (1894); Schreyer v. Turner Flouring Co., 29 Ore. I (1896).
9
2I Supra, note 3.
0Supra,note 19.
2 4 8 Minn. 319 (1892).

'Stanton
v. N. Y. & E. R. R. Co., supra,note 3.
23
Supra, note i9.
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tion. Later cases in the lower courts have consequently said that a
corporation can ratify its promoters' contracts and most of these cases
have cited the Oakes case for that proposition.u On the other hand
some of the lower courts have held that the corporation can adopt,
and some of these cases have cited the Oakes case for that proposition.2 But it is important to note that in none of the New York
cases, which have said that the corporation could ratify, has there
been involved a question like that presented in the case of McArthur v.
Times PrintingCo., which made it necessary for the court to carefully
distinguish between the two terms. When such a question is presented to the New York courts, they will, no doubt, follow the reasoning of Judge Mitchell in the McArthur case and of judge Gray in the
dissenting opinion of the Oakes case, but it is hoped that the courts
will not wait until such time to depart from the incorrect use and
loose construction of the term "ratification."
It has generally been held that it is a question for the jury whether
there has been an adoption by the corporation of the promoters' contract.2 Where the only evidence of adoption is the acceptance of
benefits there is no doubt that the jury will, under proper instructions,
find that the corporation has adopted the contract and is therefore
liable in an action on the contract. But there may be circumstances
under which it would be impossible to find that the corporation was
liable on the contract, and therefore liability must be worked out, if
at all, on some theory of quasi-contract. For example, in an English
case the corporation, though it had accepted benefits of the promoters' contract, could not be held liable on any theory of adoptionthe making of a new contract-because the corporation believed that
the pre-incorporation contract of the promoters was binding upon it.
In another English case 8 the company formally ratified the contract
of the promoters and it was correctly held that the company was not
liable in an action on the contract,as ratification is impossible. In both
cases it was intimated that the company would be liable for benefits
conferred upon it in an action of quasi-contract. On principle, such
a result would be sound, since the plaintiff has conferred benefits upon
the company with the expectation of being paid therefor, and the
company has accepted them knowing that the plaintiff expected pay,
and since the company cannot be held liable in an action on the contract,it should be held liable in an action of quasi-contract to prevent
its unjust enrichment at the expense of the plaintiff. Such a result
24
Mesinger v. Mesinger Bicycle Saddle Co., 44 App. Div. (N. Y.) 26 (1899);
Martin v. Remington-Martin Co., 95 App. Div. (N. Y.) 18 (1904); Bond v.
Atlantic Terra Cotta Co., 137 App. Div. (i. Y.) 671 (1910); Gordon v. House of
Childhood, 83 Misc. (N. Y.) 74 (1913); Galdieri & Co., Inc. v. Waist Co., 98
Misc.
(N. Y.) 612 (1917).
25
Hall v. Herter Bros., 83 Hun (N. Y.) 19 (894); Burke v. Lincoln-Valentine
Co., 28 Misc. (N. Y.) 202 (1899); Quee Drug Co. v. Plant, 55 App. Div. (N. Y.)
8726(1900); Bond v. Atlantic Terra Cotta Co., supra, note 25.
Van Shaick v. Third Ave. R. R. Co., 38 N. Y. 346 (1868); Oakes v. Cattaraugus Water Co., supra,note 19.
11n re Northumberland Hotel Co., 33 Ch. Div. (Eng.) I6 (1886).
28
In re Dale & Plant, 6I L. T. (Eng.) 2o6 (1889). See also In re Hereford &
S. Wales Wagon Co., 2 Ch. Div. (Eng.) 621 (x876); In re Empress Engineering
Co., 16 Ch. Div. (EUg.) 125 (1880).
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should follow where the company has expressly refused to adopt its
promoters' contract but has, nevertheless, accepted the benefits with
the knowledge that the plaintiff expected
remuneration. There is,
29
however, a dictum to the contrary.
There is another class of cases where the corporation has been held
liable in an action of quasi-contract. Where services, necessary for
the formation of the corporation, have been rendered by one of the
promoters or a third person before incorporation with the expectation
that the corporation would pay therefor when organized, it has been
held that the corporation is liable in quasi-contract if it afterwards
accepts the benefits of such services.30 But, on the other hand, many
courts have held that there is no quasi-contractual liability under
such circumstances. 31
Fred S. Reese, Jr., '18.
Criminal Law: Suspended sentence; Right of convict to notice
and hearing before commitment.-In Ex parte Lucero, 168 Pac.
(N. M.) 713 (1917), the petitioner, who had been brought to trial in

1913, was sentenced to a term in the penitentiary of from two to three
years under an indictment charging a felony. This sentence was suspended during good behaviour. In 1916 the court, having found that
the convict had violated the condition upon which his sentence had
been suspended, committed him to custody without giving him notice
or an opportunity to be heard. The question raised was whether he
had been deprived of his liberty without due process of the law, in
violation of his constitutional rights.' The counsel on both sides
stated that they were unable to find a precedent on this proposition.
The court compared the situation of the petitioner to that of one
who, having been conditionally pardoned, violates the condition, and
cited cases holding that such a person is entitled to notice and a hearing before he may be recommitted to custody. It also stated that, on
principle, the suspension of sentence on condition gave to the petitioner a valuable right, of which he ought not to be arbitrarily
deprived, and held that he was entitled to notice and a hearing, but
not to a jury trial, unless he should plead that he was not the same
person who had originally been convicted.
In New Mexico the right of a court to suspend sentence on stich
conditions as it sees fit is expressly given by statute,2 but the statutes
of that state contain no provision as to the procedure by which the
convict shall be committed to custody for the violation of such condi29 Sullivan v. Detroit, etc., Ry., 135 Mich. 661 (I904).
30Little Rock & Fort Smith R. R. Co. v. Perry, 37 Ark. 164, 191 (I88I); Grand
R. B. Co. v. Rollins, 13 Colo. 4 (1889); Farmers' Bank of Vine Grove v. Smith,
1O5 Ky. 816 (1899); Taussig v. St. L. & K. Ry. Co., I66 Mo. 28,38 (1901); Low
v. Railroad Co., 45 N. H. 370 (1864); Hall v. Vt. & Mass. R. R. Co., 28 Vt. 4O

(1856).

31R., R. I. & St: L. R. R. Co. v. Sage, 65 11. 328 (1872); Marchand v. Loan &
Pledge Ass'n., 26 La.Ann. 389 (1874); Wright v. St. Louis Sugar Co., 146 Mich.
555 (1966); Weatherford, etc., Ry. Co. v. Granger, 86 Tex. 350, 357 (1894);

Jones v. Smith, 87 S. W. (Tex.)

210 (1905).

'New Mexico Constitution, Art. 2, sec. 18; United States Constitution, I4th
Amendment, sec. i.
2N. M. Ann. Stats. (1915) sec. 5075.
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tions. In determining what this procedure should be, it is necessary
to consider the nature of the rights which a suspended sentence gives
to a convict. In Ex parteBates,3 it is said by the same court, that the
power to suspend sentence is exercised as part of the discretionary
power of the court in rendering judgment, and that, while the court
has the power to suspend or postpone sentence at the time of giving
judgment, it may not stay the execution of a sentence already passed.
In People ex rel. Forsyth v. Court of Sessions,4 Judge O'Brien, of the
New York Court of Appeals, holding that a statute5 giving the courts
power to suspend sentence is not unconstitutional as infringing upon
the pardoning power vested in the governor,6 said that, while a
pardon takes away all the penalties and disabilities of a convict and
restores him to his civil rights, blotting out of existence his guilt, the
suspension of sentence "simply postpones the judgment of the cout
temporarily or indefinitely, but the conviction and liability following
it, and all civil disabilities, remain and become operative when judgment is rendered.' 17 The court also doubted the power of a judge to
suspend sentence on such a condition that it would be necessary to
try a question of fact before the convict could be committed to
custody. In People v. Goodrich,8 it was held that no distinction should
be made between the power to postpone or suspend sentence when
judgment is rendered, and the power to suspend or stay the execution
of a sentence already passed, and that a court may exercise the latter
as well as the former.
As pointed out in the principal case, one who violates the condition
of a pardon may not be committed to custody without a hearing. 9
The proceedings may be informal, and, though the court may in its
discretion grant a jury trial, the accused isnot entitled to such a trial
as a matter of right, except upon the question of his identity with the
person originally convicted. 10 The conditional pardon, as indicated
'20 N. M. 542 (I915).
414I N. Y. 288 (1894).

6The statute authorizing courts to suspend sentence is now sec. 2188 of the
N.6Y. Penal Law. See also N. Y. Code Crim. Proc., sees. 483, 487.
New York Constitution, Art. 4, sec. 5.
7In Matter of Hart, 29 N. D. 38 (1914), Spalding, C. J., in a dissenting opinion
says that a suspended sentence "does not restore to him his rights as a citizen, or
wipe out the record of his conviction; the defendant enjoys his liberty outside the
walls of the jail, yet he remains under the sentence to which he has been condenned, and may be imprisoned at any time."
8149 N. Y. Supp. 4o6 (1914).

9Ex parle Alvarez v. Florida, 50 Fla. 24 (1905); State ex rel. O'Connor v.
Wolfer, 53 Minn. 135 (1893). See also People v. Potter, I Park. Cr. R. (N. Y.)

47, 62 (1845), as to the mode of procedure recommended by the attorney general.
In Ex parleBrady, 70 Ark. 376 (1902), a pardon was granted on condition that the
grantee should not repeat the offense, and he afterwards committed the same
offense and was convicted therefor. It was held that the condition of the pardon
having been broken, the former judgment of conviction was restored. The court
said that while it might have been more regular to have first brought Brady before
the circuit court to show cause why judgment should not be entered against him,
the failure to do so was an irregularity which furnished no ground for his discharge
from custody, as it clearly appeared that the pardon had been annulled by his own
act. It would seem that this case was decided on the ground that his second conviction judicially established the fact that he had violated the condition of his
pardon.
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in the Forsyth case," restores to the convict all his privileges as a free
citizen and arbitrarily to take these rights away from him would be a
deprivation of liberty without due process of the law. It is difficult
to comprehend the distinction apparently drawn by the New York
court in the last mentioned case between the quantum of liberty
acquired under a conditional pardon and that acquired under a sentence suspended on condition, since a suspended sentence in New York
is only allowed in cases of misdemeanors, and in the case of misdemeanors a sentence does not carry with it civil disabilities. 2 In each
case commitment will seemingly deprive one of the same degree of.
personal liberty, and "due process" requires that one shall not be
deprived of personal liberty without notice and a hearing." The
New York court was therefore correct when in the case of People ex
rel. Stumpf v. Craig14 it held that a convict, on violation of his parole,
is entitled to notice and a hearing before he may be committed to
custody. It is to be noted that in New Mexico it is possible to suspend
sentence and still leave the convict under civil disabilities. 5 This
was the situation of the petitioner in the principal case, and yet it was
held that he was entitled to notice and a hearing before commitment.
On principle it seems reasonably clear that a suspended sentence gives
at least some personal liberty even though it is allowed in the case of a
felony where sentence involves civil disabilities, and that an arbitrary
deprivation of this would be a violation of the due process clause of the
federal and state constitutions.
10
Rx parte Alvarez v. Florida and State ex rd. O'Connor v. Wolfer, supra,
note 9. But in People v. Moore, 62 Mich. 496 (1886), it was held that a pardoned
convict charged with having violated the condition of his release must be arrested,
held, and tried in the same manner as any other offender.
n'Supra,note 4.
"Sec. 2188 of the N. Y. Penal Law provides that the sentence of one who has
been convicted of a felony cannot be suspended, and therefore a suspension of
sentence under this statute is possible only in the case of misdemeanors. Sec. 5Io
of the same law provides that 'a sentence of imprisonment in a state prison for any
term less than for life, forfeits-all the public offices, and suspends, during the term
of the sentence, all the civil rights, and all private trusts, authority, or powers of,
or held by theperson sentenced." Sec. 2 defines a felony as a "crime which is or
may be punishable by x. Death; or 2. Imprisonment in a state prison." It
follows that sec. sio applies only to felonies. Hence a person whose sentence is
suspended is not subjected to any civil disabilities under sec. 51o.
"Petition of Doyle, 16 R. I. 537 (1889); In re Allen, 82 Vt. 365 (1909). In
Hagarv. Reclamation District, I I I U. S. 7o1, 708 (1884) itis said: "Undoubtedly
where life and liberty are involved, due process requires that there be a regular
course of judicial proceedings, which imply that the party affected shall have
notice and an opportunity to be heard."
'L479 Misc. (N. Y.) 98 (1913).
15N. M. Ann. Stats. (1915), secs. 5062, 5075, and 5086; New Mexico Constitution, Art. 7, sec. I.
"Most of the cases dealing with the termination of a suspended sentence throw
little light on the question as to what sort of a hearing, if any, is required. In
Commonwealth v. Miller, 63 Pa. Super. Ct. 548 (1916), the convict under suspended sentence was committed to a house of correction after a hearing in open
court. It was held that it was not necessary that the record of the second proceeding should show a formal adjudication that the defendant was guilty of a
second offense, as the court was merely imposing the sentende suspended by the
court at the first hearing, at which time the question of her guilt had been adjudicated. InExparteMoore,12 Cal. App. 161 (i9o9); Peoplev. Patrich, 118 Cal.
332 (1897); and People v. Goodrich, supra, note 8, it appears that the convict
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It is quite evident that a suspended sentence may be terminated
without a jury trial, except when the identity of the accused is in
issue.'7 The violation of the condition (if the suspended sentence is
no more a crime, in itself, than is the violation of the condition of a
pardon, and it has been held that the latter is not a crime. 8 But
where the identity of the alleged convict is in issue, the situation is
different, for the denial of a jury trial in this case might result in the
imprisonment of one who has never had such a trial.
Charles V. Parsell,Jr., '.rp.
Evidence: Enforced physical acts as self incrimination.-Two
cases have recently arisen-dealing with the familiar self incrimination
clauses of the federal and state constitutions. In State v. Barela, x68
Pac. (N. M.) 545 (1917), the sheriff, acting under no judicial process,
made the accused take off his shoes, and fitted them to tracks near
the scene of the crime. The introduction of this testimony was held
not to violate the constitutional guarantee against self incrimination.
The court said, "The provisions against self incrimination are limited
to testimonial compulsion under process of some kind directed against
the defendant as a witness. It cannot and does not logically apply to
actions of the defendant under compulsion of persons or officers without judicial sanction." In People v. Sallow, Ioo Misc. (N. Y.) 447
(zpi7), the finger prints of the prisoner were taken without his consent
by officers acting under legislative powers. Referring to cases of like
nature the court said, "In all these cases, inasmuch as the defendant
was merely required to remain passive, it was held that there was no
element of torture." It distinguished this from compelling the
defendant to write his name, an act calling for volition. It will be
seen that while reaching the same result, the reasons given differ in
the two cases above. In the Barelacase the testimony was admitted
both because the act itself was not of the nature contemplated in the
prohibition, and because judicial process was lacking in the officer.
In the Sallow case the officer was acting under judicial authority, and
the holding was based entirely upon the nature of the act.
The precise meaning of this constitutional guarantee has always
been the subject of much discussion and confusion. Three distinct
elements enter into the opinions on the subject: (i) whether the
examination or act was under judicial process, (2) whether the
examination or act was compulsory, (3) if compulsory, whether such
compulsion was testimonial. It is universally agreed that unless
there be compulsion such testimony will not be excluded, and that
was at least brought before court previous to commitment. In Ex parleLawson,
76 Tex. Cr. Rep. 419 (1915), it was held that a suspension of sentence on good

behaviour could be set aside only on final judgment of conviction in another case
and not pending an appeal from such conviction. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 865d, provides that, "When sentence is suspended the judgment of
the court on that subject shall be that sentence of the judgment of conviction shall
be suspended during the good behaviour of the defendant. By the term 'good
behaviour' is meant that the defendant shall not be convicted of any felony
during the time of such suspension." See also sec. 865e, providing that in case of
a second
conviction, no new trial may be had in the first conviction.
"187To this effect is Ex parle Bates, supra, note 3.
State ex rel. O'Connor v. Wolfer, supra,note 9.
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consent waives the right to object.' Chamberlayne,2 in showing the
reason for the rule against self incrimination, relates the political
struggle of the times, and ascribes it as arising out of the growth of the
jury system, it being demanded by the popular party to prevent the
expedient of questioning the defendant himself by the courts of the
crown. With such an obstacle out of the way, the Whig lawyers could3
so manipulate juries as to offset the efforts of the court. Wigmore,
in a historical review of the subject, points out the following customs
leading to the enacting of the law: (i)the inquisitorial oath of the
ecclesiastical courts, developed in 1200, which pledged the accused to
answer truly, often resulting in abuse; (2) the statute of 1487 which
vested in the Star Chamber the authority to examine the accused on
oath in criminal cases; (3)the common law rule of the sixteenth
century, allowing compulsory examination of the accused while not
under oath; (4)the culmination of the dissatisfaction with the above
rules and their abuse in Lilburn'sTrial.4 This lead to statutes in 1641
abolishing the Star Chamber, and the administration of any oath
requiring answers on matters penal. This had a strong effect on the
common law courts, resulting in the rule that witnesses and accused
could not be compelled to answer, which was in force at the time of the
making of the Federal Constitution, and it is to be inferred, had a
strong influence on its drafters. It is also pointed out that the French
system of inquisitorial trials was in effect at that time and that the
effects were apparent. From these facts Wigmore draws the conclusion, that the object of the protection is to prevent "the employment of legal process to extract from the prisoner's own lips an admission of his guilt, which will thus take the place of other evidence.
* * * In other words, it is not merely compulsion that is the kernel
of the privilege, in history and in constitutional definition, but
testimonial compulsion." This principle was recognized and applied
in State v. Ah Chuey,6 in which it was held that no evidence of physical
facts can be held to come within the spirit of the constitution. Here
tattoo marks were allowed to be exhibited in the court room. In
Holt v. United States7 the defendant was compelled to put on a blouse,
and a witness was permitted to testify that it fitted him. The court
said, "the prohibition * * * is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from him, not an
exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. * * *
For when he is exhibited, whether voluntarily or by order, and even if
the order goes too far, the evidence, if material, is competent." 8
These are the leading cases which uphold the principle making the
test whether the evidence is in fact testimony. From these cases it
'State v. Struble, 71 Ia. II (1887); People v. Mead, 5o Mich. 228 (1883);
202 Mo. 1 (1907);
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 1i5 Pa. 369 (1887); State v. Fuller, 34 Mont. 12
(19o6).
2
Chamberlayne, Law of Evidence, sec. 1543.
3
Wigmore, Law of Evidence, sec. 2250 et seg.
4
3.I1ow. St. Tr. (Eng.) i315 (1637).
5
Wigmore, Law of Evidence, sec. 2263.

People v. Glover, 71 Mich. 303 (i888); State v. Taylor,

614 Nev. 79 (1879).
7218 U. S. 245 (1910).
8

sCourt relies upon Adams v. New York,

192

U. S. 585 (1903).
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would seem that it is compulsory communication, a compulsion on
the mind of the defendant which leads to disclosure, which is prohibited. Muscular exertion or exhibition of the body was not
intended to be exempted by the framers of the constitution.
The case of People v. Sallow, supra, elaborates this principle, and
distinguishes between compulsion of the mind which leads to disclosure, and compulsion of the mind which produces a physical act,
the result of which could be accomplished with no mental effort or
volition on the part of the accused. The illustration given is in compelling the witness to write his name. Without volition of the mind
there could be no disclosure of the handwriting. On the other hand,
the mind may lead to muscular exertion in the making of a finger
print, but the willing of the mind is in no way required for the act.
Such a test meets the objection, which is largely sociological in
character, that "any system of administration which permits the
prosecution to trust habitually to compulsory self disclosure as a
source of proof must itself suffer morally thereby."9 If this is
accepted as the test, the question of whether the arrest or examination
was made under due process and judicial sanction would become
secondary, if not immaterial, in this class of cases. The Barela case,
while in accord with this principle, apparently puts its decision on the
lack of judicial authority in the officer, attempting to distinguish
several cases on that ground.
The principle has been most commonly applied to cases in which the
prisoner has been compelled to stand up in the court room for identification.10
A class of cases somewhat similar to those involving handwriting is
represented by State v. Turner." In that case the accused was compelled by threats of the sheriff acting under judicial process to disclose
where a gun was. The production of the gun was held admissible.
Such disclosure is accomplished with volition compelled by the
sheriff, and clearly is not admissible on the theory set forth above.
The courts, however, apply a narrower definition to Wigmore's term,
"legal process", sayingthat an order of the court to speak or produce is
necessary to nake it incompetent, the employment of the accused's
OWigmore, Law of Evidence, sec. 2251.
"°People v. Gardner, 144 N. Y. ii9 (1894); cases cited in 28 L. R. A. 699. In
the following jurisdictions this principle has been applied to varying facts:
People v. Oliveria, 127 Cal. 376 (1899); U.S.v. Cross, 2o D.C. 365, 382 (I892);
Lee v. State, 67 So. (Fla.) 883 (1915); Territory v. Chung Nung,21 Hawaii 214
(1912); O'Brien v. State, 125 Ind.39 (89o); State v. Graham, 116La. 779 (1906);
Magee v. State, 92 Miss. 865 (i9o8); State v. Fuller, 34 Mont. 12 (19o6); Krens
v. State, 75 Neb. 294 (1905); -Nevada v. Ala Chuey, supra, note 6; State v.
Flynn, 36 N. H. 64 (1858); State v. Cerciello, 86 N. J. L. 309 (1914); People v.
Van Wormer, 175 N. Y. 188 (i9o3); People v. Austin, i99 N. Y. 446 (19io);
Statev. Graham, 74 N.C.646 (1876); State v. Thompson, i6i N. C. 238 (1912);
Angeloff v. State, 91 Ohio 361 (1914); State v. McIntosh, 78 S.E. (S. C.) 327
(1913); Lipes and Gamble v. State, i5 Lea (Tenn.) 125 (1885); Stokes v. State,
5 Baxt. (Tenn.) 619 (1875), has been cited to the contrary, but this is distinguishable on the ground that the act in the presence of the jury was prejudicial; Walker
v. State, 7 Tex. App. Rep. 245 (1879); Guerrero v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 445
(1904); State v. Nordstrom, 7 Wash. 5o6 (1893); Thorntonv. State, 117 Wis. 338
(i9o3); Holt v. U. S., supra, note 7.
1182 Kan. 787 (I91O); cases cited in 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 772.
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oath or testimonial responsibility being the act which bars. In this
way it is distinguished from Boyd v. United States," in which, by order
of the court, the defendant was compelled to bring his books and
papers into court to be used in evidence against him. This was held
to be equivalent to compelling him to testify against himself. But
such a holding, as that in State v. Turner, does not meet the objectiqn
pointed out above. A refusal to answer could not be used against the
accused, but where the answer if made can be used, such compulsion
is susceptible of the abuse meant to be guarded against.
A New York case which is sometimes relied on as setting forth a13
rule contrary to all of the preceding cases is that of People v. McCoy,
a case of bastardy proceedings, in which it was held that a compulsory
physical examination of the female prisoner under an order of the
coroner was in violation of the constitution. People v. Sallow, supra,
considers this overruled by later New York cases with which the
principle announced is not reconcilable. In People v. Van Wormer'4
evidence was admitted similar to that in Barelav. State, although there
was legal process, which indicates that the holding was wholly based
on the nature of the act.
The leading authority contrary to those already discussed is the
case of State v. Jacobs,"5 in which a negro was compelled to stand to
let the jury determine whether or not he was free. This is attempted
to be distinguished in People v. Gardner6 on the ground that this was
a means of connecting him with the crime, whereas in People v.
Gardner his appearance was merely for identification. It would seem
that this would equally connect him with the crime. If the case is
distinguishable in principle, which seems doubtful, the better ground
would be that suggested in State v. Barela,that such an exhibition in
the court room might prejudice the jury. The case is evidently
contrary in principle, but in the light of the later cases, which avoid
reference to it, the principle hardly seems to have stood the test in its
own jurisdiction.
The-Georgia cases are based on Day v. State,'7 the deciding point of
which was that the accused was made to put his foot in a track while
not under arrest, and this evidence was held inadmissible. This, as
pointed out in Barela v. State, is clearly unsound. Many Georgia
cases are based on this principle. But in a later case 8 the court
seems to regard it as immaterial whether the act was done while the
accused was under arrest or not, being equally inadmissible in either
case. The most recent important decision is that of Calhoun v. State,' 9
in which under an illegal arrest the defendant was searched and
incriminating evidence taken from him. The court held this admissible, and said that evidence is only inadmissible if the accused be
compelled to produce incriminating evidence, the evidence then
121I6 U. S. 616 (I885).

145 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 216 (1873).
I'Supra,note io.
'55o
N. C. 259 (1858).
16
Supra, note io.
1763 Ga. 667 (1879).

18Elderv. State, 143 Ga. 363 (I915).
19144 Ga. 679 (1916).
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being in the nature of an involuntary admission. The criterion is
said to be, "Who furnished the evidence?" This seems to be broadening the Georgia rule, but yet makes the physical act of production
the test, and not the mental act of disclosure. It is difficult to see
what difference it makes whose hand produces the revolver from a
person or a place, once it is ascertained that it is there.
Alabama, 0 Iowa, 21 Michigan"z and Missouri24 apparently refuse to
recognize the principle contended for, broadly holding that the
accused may refuse to do any act that may tend to incriminate him,
and that the results of such forced act are inadmissible. These
decisions appear to have been made without a study of the historical
conditions which induced the making of the constitutional clause, and
represent a small minority. The great weight of authority is in
accord with the principal cases.
L. W. Dawson, '19.
Jury: Right to trial by jury of a legal counterclaim in an equitable
action: Rule 31 of the New York General Rules of Practice.-In
Manhattan Life Insurance Co. v. Hammerstein Opera Co., et al., Ioi
Misc. (N. Y.) 6o8 (1917), an action to foreclose a mortgage, the
defendant interposed several counterclaims demanding affirmative
money judgments, and the plaintiff replied, joining issue. Defendant moved for an order to frame the issues so raised for jury trial, but
the court refused the motion on the ground that the defendant had
not complied with rule 3' of the General Rules of Practice in that he
had failed to apply for jury trial within twenty days after issue joined,
or given any sufficient reason for overlooking the default. Reliance
was placed chiefly on Mackellar v.Rogers' for the proposition that,
although the counterclaim was such as would have been triable as a
matter of right by a jury if brought in the form of an action by the
defendant against the plaintiff, yet it was not entitled to such a trial in
a foreclosure suit.
By the great weight of authority, the interposition of a counterclaim of a legal nature in an equitable action does not, in the absence
of a statute authorizing it, give the defendant a right to trial by jury
either of the action generally or of the issues raised by the reply to
the counterclaim. 2 But in New York a peculiar situation has arisenby virtue of certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure which
seem to make possible a different result.
By section 968 of the New York Code, it is provided that, "In each
of the following actions, an issue of fact must be tried by a jury unless
a jury trial is waived, or a reference is directed: ix.
An action in which
the complaint demands judgment for a sum of money only. 2. An
' 0Cooperv. State, 86 Ala. 61o (1888); Davis v. State, 1W1 Ala. IO (19Ol).
2"State v. Height, 117 Ia. 650 (1902). The case of State v. Reasby, lOO Ia. 231
(x896), in which it was held admissible for the prisoner to be compelled to stand
up in the court room, would seem to indicate an accord with this principle, but a
survey of the cases shows a failure to recognize it in its entirety. In State v.
Arthur,

129

Ia. 235 (1905), the case was made to turn upon consent.

uPeople v., Mead, supra, note i.
"State v. Eisler, 220 Mo. 67 (1909); State v. Horton, 247 Mo. 657 (1913).
1IO9 N. Y. 468 (1888).

'Ann. Cas. 1914 C, 852.
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action of ejectment; for dower; for waste; for a nuisance; or to
recover a chattel." Section 974 provides that, "Where the defendant
interposes a counterclaim, and thereupon demands an affirmative
judgment against the plaintiff, the mode of trial of an issue of fact,
arising thereupon, is the same, as if it arose in an action, brought by
the defendant, against the plaintiff, for the cause of action stated in
the counterclaim, and demanding the same judgment." The third
section involved is 970 which has the provision that, "Where a party
is entitled by the constitution, or by express provision of law, to a
trial by a jury, of one or more issues of fact, in an action not specified
in section 968 of this act, he may apply, upon notice, to the court for
an order, directing all the questions arising upon those issues, to be
distinctly and plainly stated for trial accordingly. Upon the hearing
of the application, the court must cause the issues, to the trial of
which by a jury the party is entitled, to be distinctly and plainly
stated. * * *"
Considering together sections 968 and 970, it is at once apparent
that they can be construed to give a jury trial as a matter of right on
the issues raised by a reply to a counterclaim demanding an affirnative money judgment only, when interposed to a foreclosure or
equitable suit, as in the instant case, the situation being covered by
subdivision i of section 968. The provision of section 974, that "the
mode of trial * * * is the same, as if it arose in an action,
* * *", when read with section 968, to the effect that such a trial
under the circumstances stated above must be by a jury, unless
waived or referred, would seemingly lead to the conclusion that the
defendant must have a jury trial on the issues of a counterclaim
demanding an afflirmativemoney judgment.2 The title of section 974,
"Counterclaim to be deemed an action, within the foregoing sections",
bears out this construction. 3
Any construction which would extend the scope of sections 968 and
974 beyond providing that the mode of trial shall be by jury would,
however, be unwarranted. At that point section 970 operates and
imposes several restrictions and privileges as to the manner in which
that mode of trial is to be gained, that is, certain conditions precedent
are required by the legislature upon the due performance of which the
jury trial depends. The distinction as to the limitation and operation
of sections 968 and 970 is to be found in the fact that while under
section 968 a general mode of trial is fixed, yet 97o provides in detail
the manner in which that general mode of trial is to be accomplished
in certain cases. The clause of section 970, "in an action not specified
in section 968 of this act," cannot have the effect of excluding the
operation of section 970 to counterclaims, for a counterclaim, even
though it demand judgment for a sum of money, is not strictly a
complaint in an action within the terms of section 968, however
analagous to one it may be. By its terms, section 97o expressly
excludes an action in which the complaint demands judgment for a
sum of money from the conditions precedent laid down by it to obtaining a jury trial. It does not, however, exclude cases where there is an
undoubted right of jury trial given by the constitution or by statute,
2
aDi
3

Menna v. Cooper & Evans Co., 220 N. Y. 391 (1917).
But see Mackellar v. Rogers, supra, note I, at page 471.
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unless they are mentioned in section 968. Section 970 does not
operate to destroy the right of jury trial in all other cases, nor does it
affect the mode of trial (i. e., by jury). It merely lays down certain
preliminary requirements to the exercise of that right or mode of
trial. It does not by its terms indicate in any way that what would
otherwise be a right shall, if it falls within its compass, be merely a
privilege grantable at the discretion of the court. By sections 968
and 974 a counterclaim for a money demand, even though in an
equity suit, for such suits are not excluded, gives the counterclaimant
a right to a jury trial, but to enjoy that right he must comply with the
terms of section 970. Sections 967 and 973 provide ways by which
the right may be exercised without a confusion of issues or undue
delay.
Mackellar v. Rogers,4 cited in the principal case for a contrary result
to that arrived at above, has been much misunderstood and cited as
holding what it in fact does not hold. It was a foreclosure suit to
which a counterclaim for a money demand had been interposed.
Defendant, as well as plaintiff, moved the case for trial at Special
Term, which, of course, is the same as moving for trial without a jury,
and, within subdivision 4 of section ioog, amounted to a statutory
waiver of jury trial. After this waiver the defendant moved for a
jury trial, and the motion was denied. In reviewing the action of the
court in denying the application for jury trial under these peculiar
circumstances the Court of Appeals said that the granting of the
application was withinthe discretion of the court. It is pointed out
that counterclaimants for money demands under 974 do not have an
unconditional right to jury trial under 968, but a conditional right
within 97o. A misprint on page 472 of the opinion (edition of i888)
has doubtless contributed to the misunderstanding of this case. The
first reference to section 970 is intended to be a reference to 968 as is
shown by a consideration of the context. Otherwise the statement
that such a counterclaim is not within 970 is contradicted in the next
sentence by a statement that it is within 970. The error is corrected
in the 1899 reprint. While the case mentions the extreme inconvenience of granting an application for jury trial on the eve of a trial,
there is no intimation in the case that, because a jury trial of a counter
claim for a money demand is conditional within 970, it lies within the
discretion of the court in all such cases to grant or refuse it when the
conditions there specified are complied with. The reference to discretion, which has been so frequently quoted, was a discretion to
permit the withdrawal of the waiver of jury trial.
Rule 31 of the General Rules of Practice provides that in all actions
where either party is entitled to have issues tried by a jury, either as a
matter of right or by leave of court, motion therefor must be made
4
Supra, note
5

i.
Roslyn Heights Land Co. v. Burrowes, 76 Hun (N. Y.) 62 (1894); Smith v.
Fleischman, 23 App. Div. (N. Y.) 355 (1897); Arnot v. Nevins, 44 App. Div.
(N. Y.) 61 (1899); Bennett v. Edison Electric II. Co., 164 N. Y. 131 (1900);
Ettlinger v. Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor, 122 App. Div. (N. Y.) 681 (1907);
Killeen v. Kiernan, 73 Misc. (N. Y.) 21 (1911); Gersmann v. Walpole, 79 Misc.

(N. Y.) 49 (I113); Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Hammerstein Opera Co., et at, io

Misc. (N. Y.) 6o8 (1917).
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within twenty days after issue joined or the right will be waived.
Citing Mackellar v. Rogers for the proposition that the granting of a
jury trial on a counterclaim of a money demand to an equitable claim
is discretionary with the court, the Supreme Court has held in a
number of decisions that a failure to move within the time required by
Rule 31 was a proper ground for the court to exercise its discretion
against the granting of a jury trial, since it amounted to a waiver of
any rights.6 The court in the principal case has fallen into the same
error. In a recent case the Court of Appeals has held that Rule 3 i is
invalid in so far as it purports to put any limitations upon the method
by which a jury trial is to be had as a matter of right, whether absolute
or conditional. Its effect is limited to cases where jury trial is a matter of discretion, which; as pointed out, has no application to counterclaims for money demands, whether to legal or equitable actions.
This result is arrived at by pointing out that when the legislature, by
section 970, has imposed certain conditions upon the enjoyment of the
right of jury trial it has impliedly closed the door to further conditions
by the rule making body.
'19.

Frederic M. Hoskins,

Mandamus: Nondiscretionary acts: Employment of this writ
against a chief executive.--The irreconcilable conflict of judicial
opinion in the several American jurisdictions upon the question of
whether the judiciary should have the power to direct the chief executive of a state to perform a ministerial act imposed upon him by
statute or the constitution is again emphasized in the case of State ex
rel. Turner v. Henderson, 74 So. (Ala.) 344 (1917). The Alabama
court, in line with its own precedent, decides that it can compel the
governor by a writ of mandamus to act in accordance with a statutory
enactment requiring him to sanction any proper warrant, and so, as in
the principal case, to approve one which had been regularly issued.
It appears to be uniformly recognized that the courts cannot
influence an executive's action where an exercise of discretion is
required,' but the controversy arises where the doing of a purely
ministerial act is in issue. Where this is the fact it is clear that any
officer below the chief executive may be compelled by mandamus to
do a merely ministerial act devolved upon him by the legislature, and
not delegated by the president or the governor, in performance of his
official duty.2 But is the governor amenable to this process in performing a ministerial act?
Those states which deny the right to mandamus a chief executive,
and they appear to be in the majority, 3 invoke as one basis of their
sArnot v. Nevins, and Ettlinger v. Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor, supra,
note
5.
7
Moot v. Moot, 214 N. Y. 204 (1915).
'Rice v. Governor, 207 Mass. 577 (1911); Sutherland v. Governor, 29 Mich.
320 (1874); People ex rd. Hammond v. Leonard, 74 N. Y. 443 (1878).
2Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch (U. S.) 137 (1803); Kendall v. U. S., 12 Peters

(U. S.)

524

(x838); Willoughby on the Constitution, sec. 766.

3Hawkins v. Governor, I Ark. 570 (1839); State ex rel. Bisbee v. Governor, 17

Fla. 67 (1879); State ex rel.Low v. Towns, 8 Ga. 36o (185o); People ex rel. Bacon
v. Cullom, 100 I11. 472 (1881); State ex rel. Oliver et al. v. Warmoth, 22 La. Ann.
' (187o); In re Dennett, 32 Me. 5o8 (1851); Sutherland v. Governor, 29 Mich.
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holding the constitutional doctrine that the executive, legislative and
judicial branches of the government shall be separate, distinct and
independent of one another. As a conclusion they deduce that the
officers of one branch cannot discharge the functions of another, and
in turn they cannot be subject to the control of the others, since they
are supreme within the sphere of their respective powers.
It is true that the separation of the powers of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government is a principle of our state
and federal constitutions, but this does not mean absolute isolation of
one from the other. This is very evident when it is considered that the
Federal Constitution itself provides for joint action of the several
departments. The President's veto and pardoning powers, and the
impeaching power of Congress are fair examples.4 It is asserted that
vesting in the judiciary the right to compel a chief executive to act
would not accomplish merely co-operation, but would amount to an
exercise of power that would threaten the independence of the executive. But it may be argued that the very instances just mentioned,
where the co-operation of one department in the affairs of another is
constitutionally recognized, afford greater opportunities for an interference by one branch in the affairs of another than would the power
of a court to mandamus the chief executive in a case where he is
without discretion but under an absolute duty to act. Can there be
any reasonable distinction, as far as the separation of powers goes,
between the executive grant of personal liberty to one imprisoned by
the judiciary, and the giving of judicial relief against a clear wrong
committed by the chief executive because of a failure to perform his
nondiscretionary duty? Precedent has shown the reasonableness of
the exercise of the veto power by the chief executive, and the exercise
by the courts in eleven states5 of the power to mandamus the state's
chief executive to enforce the doing of a ministerial act is some evidence at least of the reasonably beneficial results of this practice.
Nevertheless, though some courts permit the exercise of this power,6
there are practical considerations, which in most jurisdictions have
carried conclusive weight against allowing its exercise. In the first
place, there is too great a danger of harassment of the governor with
vexatious litigation, for who is to tell whether a particular act required
of him is ministerial or political? It is not to be expected that the
Ricev. Austin, I9 Minn. 103 (1872); Vicksburg & M. Ry. Co. v.
Lowry, 6i Miss. 102 (1883); State ex rel. Robb v. Stone, 120 Mo. 428 (1894);
Statev. Governor, 25 N. J. L.331 (1856), (confined to duty imposedby the constitution and not by statute); People ex iel. Broderick v. Morton, i56 N. Y. 136
(1898); State ex rel. Latture v. Board of Inspectors, 114 Tenn. 516 (1904). In
Texas such remedy was provided in an amendment to the constitution in 1891.
Veto power-United States Constitution, art I, sec. 7; pardoning powerUnited States Constitution, art. 2, sec. 2; impeachment by Congress-United
States Constitution, art. i, secs. 2 and 3.
'State ex iel. Higdon v. Jelks, 138 Ala. ix5 (1902); Stuart v. Haight, 39 Cal.
87 (1870); Greenwood Cemetery Land Co. v. Routt, 17 Colo. 156 (1892); Martin
v.Ingham, 38 Kan. 641 (1888); Traynorv.Beckham, 116 Ky. 13 (1903); Groome
v. Gwinn, 43 Md. 572 (1875); Territory ex rel. Tanner v. Potts, 3 Mont. 364
(1879); State ex rel. Bates v. Thayer, 31 Neb. 82 (189i); State ex rel. Laughton v.
Adams, i9 Neb. 370 (x886); Cotten v. Ellis, 52 N. C. 545 (i86o); State ex rel.
Trauger v. Nash, 66 Ohio St. 612 (1902).
320 (1874);

6Note 5, supra.
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judiciary would wilfully invade the province of the executive department, and still there would be much risk of involving the governor in
such litigation that the public's right to his full effort in his official
capacity would be infringed. Again, there is the very germane
consideration that a writ of mandamus will not be issued where it is
unavailing.7 It is asserted that a court has no jurisdiction over the
person of the governor, and if he refuses to obey the writ, the court
cannot commit his person for the purpose of contempt proceedings, 8
which is the only means of compelling observance of the writ. Even
if he voluntarily appears it is declared that the court does not thereby
gain jurisdiction over him,9 and his obedience would be entirely
optional. Of a somewhat similar nature is the argument that the
governor has control of the military forces of the state, and therefore,
cannot be compelled to act, having the superior force at his command.10
These jurisdictions find in the power of impeachment the only and
sufficient safeguard against the refusal of the chief executive to perform his official duties. And, as it is well recognized that private
rights and privileges must give way in many instances to those of the
public," the denial of a writ of mandamus against the governor, even
when he has refused to perform a ministerial act, is regarded as a
necessary and reasonable exception to the maxim "for every wrong
there is a legal remedy."
The Supreme Court of the United States has not squarely passed
upon the right of a state court to mandamus the governor nor of the
federal courts to mandamus the President. The declarations in
Marbury v. Madison 2 to the effect that the President is not amenable
to such process for compelling performance of his duty cannot be
accepted as authority on this point, for the case decided only that the
Act of Congress conferring original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court
in mandamus proceedings was unconstitutional. There is, however,
a federal case distinctly holding that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to enjoin the President from carrying into effect an Act of
Congress.'
The same reasons that justify this case apply equally
where the attempt is made to compel him to enforce such an act.
Whether it is restraint or compulsion, the court cannot enforce its
decree if obedience is refused.
There is a declaration in Marbury v. Madison by Chief Justice
Marshall which would seem to indicate that the Supreme Court
favors the issuance of a writ of mandamus by a state court against the
governor. It is to the following effect: "It is not by the office of the
person to whom the writ is directed, but the nature of the thing to be
done that the propriety or impropriety of issuing a mandamus is to
7
State ex rel. Dulin v. Lehre, 7 Rich. (S. C.) 234 (1854); People ex rel.
Robinson
v. O'Keefe, ioo N. Y. 572, 577 (1885); Com'th ex ret. Burns v. Hadley, io6 Pa.

St. 245,252 (1884); People ex rel. Power etal. v. Rose, 219 Ill.
46 (19o5).

8People ex rel. Broderick v. Morton, 156 N. Y. 136, 145 (1898).
'Stateex rel. Robb v. Stone, supra, note 3.
1"Vicksburg & M. Ry. v. Lowry, 61 Miss. 102, 104 (1883).

"People ex rel. Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U. S. 552 (19o5); Common-

wealth v. Alger, 7 Cush, (Mass.) 53 (185i).
12Supra, note

2.

"State of Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 475 (1866),
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be determined."' 4 But in view of the grounds stated in the case of
Mississippi v. Johnson,'5 for refusing to enjoin the President, the
Supreme Court would probably not recognize the right of a state
court to mandamus the Governor. 6 The Supreme Court of the
United States has also decided that it has no inherent power, nor can
such power be given to it by Congress, to compel a chief executive of a
state to perform the ministerial duty, placedupon him by the Constitution of the United States, namely the duty to deliver up upon demand
of the chief executive of another state 6a fugitive from justice who has
committed a crime in the other state.
Eugene F. Gilligan, 'ip.
Public Service Corporation: Right to discontinue unprofitable
service.-In Moore v. Lewisburg & R. E. Ry. Co., 93 S. E. (W. Va.)
762 (1917), the plaintiff, a stockholder of the railroad company,
sought to enjoin the tearing up and disposing of the railroad property,
which was about to take place pursuant to a vote of the stockholders
to dissolve and surrender the franchises held by the corporation, and
to sell its assets. Plaintiff contended that defendant being a public
service corporation, could not dissolve and surrender its franchises,
but that the property of the defendant must be sold as a going railroad
company, including in such sale not only the physical property but
the franchises thereof. The plaintiff claimed that the resolution of
the stockholders was an ultra vires act, which could be enjoined by
any stockholder. It appeared that from the beginning the railroad in
question was a losing venture. The injunction was refused, the court
holding that, "when it appears to the stockholders of a public service
corporation that its business cannot be operated except at a loss, and
that a fair test has been made in order to determine this fact, they
have authority to discontinue the business of such a corporation and
surrender its franchises." In this case the court seems to be of the
opinion that the decision of the stockholders controls, but admits that
some authorities recognize the right of the state in a proper proceeding
to review the action of stockholders. The court concludes, however,
that, granting that the stockholders decide this question at their
peril, a stockholder who is not peculiarly injured cannot complain,
and the evidence showed that the plaintiff would be benefited, not
injured.
Public service corporations operate under permission from the
state either by charter or under general law. Because they have
received special privileges from the state, as, for example, the exclusive
right to operate the particular business and the right of eminent
domain, they are under greater duties to the public than the ordinary
corporation. They must serve all without discrimination, and must
provide adequate service, and not charge extortionate rates.'
141 Cranch (U. S.) 137, 170 (1803).
15

Supra,note 13.
16And see the language of the court in Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. (U. S.)
524 (1838).
' TCom'th of Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. (U. S.) 66 (i86i).
'Jencks v. Coleman, 2 Sumner (U. S.) 221 (1835); Bennett v. Dutton, ioN. H
481 (1839); Great Western Ry. Co. v. Sutton, L. R. 4 H. L.226 (1868); Smyth v.
Ames, 169 U. S. 466 (1897).
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Is a public service corporation, having once accepted a charter and
operated under it, bound to continue to operate such road, or may it
abandon the road in whole or in part? Whether the company's
right under its charter is permissive or obligatory, it is generally
denied that a company can partially abandon its service, and still
retain its franchise,2 the courts holding that after the company has
built and operated its road it has become obligated to continue to
exercise its franchises, and the obligation is even greater where the
company has been the recipient of land grants and subsidies to aid its
construction.3 It is, however, not necessary for the company to maintain equal service on all parts of the road.4 There is some authority
for the proposition that where the franchise is permissive a corporation can partially abandon its service and still retain its franchise;
the courts in these cases saying that a corporation may be compelled
to perform a duty imposed by statute, which duty may be express or
implied, but that when a corporation is granted the privilege of doing
an act and there are no terms expressly or impliedly making it obligatory to do the act, no duty will be imposed.5 In 6 all cases there is a
duty to give only such service as the public needs.
A solvent corporation would not as a practical matter abandon its
entire road. When there is a total abandonment of the road the
problem of the right to surrender the franchise arises. Where no
time is specified in the charter for the continuance of the business, a
corporation may be dissolved by the voluntary surrender of its
franchise. The decision of the majority of the stockholders to dissolve is binding on the corporation, for it is part of the implied contract among the shareholders that the majority may control the
property of the corporation so long as they act in good faith and do
not divert it to a purpose other than that for which the corporation is
organized.7 When, however, the charter provides that the corporation shall continue in operation for a specified time, it has been held
that it cannot be dissolved before then without the unanimous consent of all the stockholders" What has been said applies only so far
as the corporation and its stockholders. are concerned, for before a
voluntary surrender is effectual as between the corporation and the"
state such surrender must be accepted by the state. Charters are in
many respects compacts between the government and the corporation,
and as the government cannot deprive the corporators of their fran2
Brownell v. Old Colony R. R. Co., 164 Mass. 29 (1895); State v. Hartford &
N. H. R. R. Co., 29 Conn. 538 (i86i); Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Henning
Grinsfelder v. Spokane St. Ry. Co., i9Wash.
Fed. Cas. 4666 (1878); State, ex rel.
518 (1898); State, ex rel. City of Bridgeton v. Bridgeton & M. T. Co., 62 N. J. L.

592 (1899).
3
4State v. Sioux City & P. R. R. Co., 7 Neb. 357 (1878).
Commonwealth v. Fitchburg R. R. Co., 12 Gray (Mass.) I8O (185,8).
5
Elmendorf, 9o Tex. 520 (1897);

SherSan Antonio St. Ry. Co. v. State ex rel.
wood
v. A. & D. Ry. Co., 94 Va. 291 (,897).
6
People v. R., W. & 0. R. R. Co., 103 N. Y. 95 (1886); Commonwealth v.
Fitchburg.R. R. Co., supra, note 4; Moore v. Brooklyn City R. R. Co., 2o8 N. Y.
98 7(1888); City of Potwin Place v. Topeka Ry. Co., 51 Kan. 609 (2893).
Trisconi v. Winship, 9 So. (La.) 29 (1891); Treadwell v. Salisbury Mfg. Co.,
7 Gray (Mass.) 393 (2856).
sBarton v. The Enterprise Building Assn., 114 Ind. 226 (2887); New York, by
sec. 221, Gen. Corp. Law, allows dissolution by a vote of less than all.
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chises in violation of the compact, the corporators cannot put an end
to the compact without the consent of the government. It is the
acceptance which gives efficacy to the surrender.9 A surrender of a
corporate franchise is not to be presumed from mere non-user.1 0
Dissolution of corporations is usually regulated by statute, and it has
been held that when a method of procedure is so prescribed it is
exclusive."
In those cases in which abandonment is not justified, what is the
procedure for forcing the railroad company to perform its obligations?
What the form of action will be depends upon what sort of relief is
sought. If the continuation of the service is desired, mandamus to
compel the company to operate is the proper remedy12
In any case where it is shown that the public does not need the service mandamus will not be granted, for, as has already been stated, it
is the duty of a railroad company to give only such service as the
public needs; 13 nor will mandamus be granted when it will be useless.' 4
Injunction is the remedy in those instances where there will be irreparable injury, as where part of the track is being taken up, or there is
other dismantling of the road. 5 In any case of the abuse of franchises
the state can bring a direct proceeding for forfeiture. 16 In most states
where there is not a statutory provision, 7 quo warranto proceedings
are the appropriate means of testing the right to exercise corporate
franchises as well as the proper remedy from the abuse by a corporation of the powers with which it has been invested.' 8 A suit for
specific performance is not an allowable remedy. 9
Jane M. G. Foster, '8.
Real Property: Drainage of surface waters.--The question of the
rights and liabilities of land owners in the drainage of surface waters
is raised in the cases of Thompson v. Andrews, 165 N. W. (S. Dak.) 9,
9Harris v. Muskingum Mfg. Co., 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 267 (836); Boston Glass
Mfg. Co. v. Langdon, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 49 (1834); Bradt v. Benedict, 17 N. Y. 93
(1858).
"Regents of Univ. of Md. v. Williams, 9 Gill. &J. (Md.) 365 (1838); Milwaukee
Electric Ry. & Light Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 95 Wis. 39 (1897).
"Kohl v. Lilienthal, 8i Cal. 378 (1889).
"State v. Sioux City R. R. Co., supra, note 3; State, ex rel. Grinsfelder v.
Spokane St. Ry. Co., supra, note 2; Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Henning,
supra, note 2; State, ex rel. City of Bridgeton v. Bridgeton M. T. Co., supra,
note 2; State v. D. C., M. & T. Ry. Co., 53 Kan. 329 (1894).
1Supra, note 6.
"4 Ohio & M. Ry. Co. v. People, 120 Ill. 200 (1887); Savannah & 0. Canal Co.
v. Shuman, 91 Ga. 400 (1893); State v. D. C., M. & T. Ry. Co., supra,note 12.
5People v. The A. & Vt. R. R. Co., 37 Barb. (N. Y.) 216 (i86i), aff'd 24 N. Y.
261 (1862).

'"Com-onwealth v. Union F. & M. Ins. Co., 5 Mass. 230 (1809).
17Sec. 131 Gen. Corp. Law of N. Y. provides for an action by the Atty. Gen.
"8State v. Portland Natural Gas & Oil Co., 153 Ind. 483 (1899); State v. Real

Estate Bk., 5 Ark. 595 (1844).

It seems that in New York by the common law scire facias was the proper

remedy where there was a legal body capable of acting, but which was guilty of
abuse of power, Slee v. Bloom, 5 Johns. Ch. 366 (1821); and quo warranto
was the remedy where there was a usurpation of powers by a body. People v.
Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. 358 (1818). See note 17, supra.
"People v. A. & Vt. R. R. Co., supra, note 15.
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(1917), and Holman v. Richardson, 76 So. (Miss.) 136, (49X7), both of
which seem to extend the doctrine of the civil law as to surface drainage beyond the general run of decisions. The former holds that the
upper owner of agricultural land may deepen a ditch on his premises,
in the reasonable course of improving his land, even though thereby
an increased flow of surface water comes on to the lands of lower
proprietors, provided the direction of the flow is not changed. In the
Holman case, the lower owner was restrained from blocking a natural
drain and also from erecting a brick wall along the boundary line
between adjoining city lots, the former because it was contrary to the
civil law and the latter because, although the lower owner may fend
diffused water from his land, yet if two ways of doing so are equally
possible and one is reasonable and the other unreasonable, the reasonable way must be adopted. It was decided that artificial drains
would cost no more and would be a more reasonable way of diverting
the diffused water than the brick wall.
It might be well first to outline the scope of the term "surface
water." Surface water includes such water as is carried off by surface
drainage, derived from falling rains and melting snows, and it continues to be surface water until it reaches some well defined channel in
which it is accustomed-to and does flow with other waters.' In cases
close to the border line it is often difficult to distinguish between
running streams and surface water; but in general surface water is
characterized by the absence of a continuous flow in a defined natural
channel.
The jurisdictions of the United States show a wide divergence of
opinion on this question of surface water drainage. They fall into
two classes: *those which have adopted the doctrine of the civil law,2
and those which follow the common law rule. According to Domat,
the civil law rule of continental Europe is that, if rain-water or other
waters have their course regulated from one ground to another, the
proprietors cannot change the ancient course of the waters. The
upper proprietor cannot change the course or make it more rapid, or
in any way prejudice the lower proprietor, and the lower proprietor
cannot prevent his ground from receiving the water in the manner in
which it has been regulated. American jurisdictions have rejected
the civil law rule insofar as it may have compelled upper owners to
send down surface waters;, the easement in the upper proprietor to
send down such waters if he wishes to do so, and the servitude owed by
the lower land to receive them, have been adopted. In LouisianaP
there is an absolute servitude in the lower estate to receive waters
which run naturally from the estate above. As between owners of
higher and lower grounds the upper proprietor has an easement to
have surface water flow naturally from his land to the land of the
lower proprietor, 4 which is subject to a corresponding servitude to
'Crawford v. Rambo, 44 Ohio St. 279 (1886); Price v. Oregon R. Co., 47 Or.
350 (19o6); Rait v. Furrow, 74 Kan. IOi (19o6).
21 Domat, Civil Law (Cushing's ed.) p. 616.
3
Rev. Civil Code La., art. 66o.
4
Sanguinetti v. Pock, 136 Cal. 466 (1902); Butler v. Peck, 16 Oh. St. 335
(x865).
5
Southem Ry. Co. v. Lewis, 165 Ala. 555 (1910).
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receive it, and the lower proprietor has not, therefore, the right to
obstruct its flow, 6 nor cast it bck upon the land above.7 The upper
proprietor may not, however, collect surface water originally flowing
in one direction and turn it on to the land of a lower proprietor to his
damage; 8 and where the difference in level between lands is inconsiderable, the burden is upon the upper proprietor to show that his is
the higher in order to establish his right to the easement.'
To this general rule there are two exceptions: diffused surface
water, i. e., surface water which is diffused over a wide area and from
the conformity of the land flows in no special direction; and surface
water as it relates to city lots. The former is generally held to impose
no duty on the lower land to receive it.1 The rights of lot owners in
cities are not regulated by the same rules as govern in respect to farm
land;" the civil law rule does not apply under the artificial conditions2
created by the building of cities and imprbvement of city lots.'
Holman v. Richardson, in which the Mississippi court reverses its
previous decision, 13 fails to acknowledge this latter exception, and
puts Mississippi law as to surface drainage on the same plane for city
lots and farm lands. While the exception as to diffused water is
recognized in this case, it is with a limitation on the lower proprietor
to act reasonably.
What is known as the common law rule apparently did not originate
in the body of the common law in England, but in the state of Massachusetts as late as 1865. Previous to that time, there were dicta that
no action will lie for the interruption of surface drainage,'14 but the
cases all failed for variance in proof. Gannon v. Hargadon5 is considered to mark the adoption of the common law rule, so called. No
English cases are cited, but the court depends on the cases of Luther v.
Winnisimmet6 (which failed because of a variance), Dickinson v.
Worcester 17 (which also failed because of variance), and Flagg v.
Worcester. 8 In this last case the plaintiff brought action against a
city because by the cofistruction of the city highways it had diverted
surface water on to his land, and the dictum in Parksv. Newburyport,19
another Massachusetts case which failed on account of variance in
proof, is applied as law. Gannon v. Hargadon0 stands for the broad
principle that a person may so use his land as to prevent surface water
6

Gormley v. Sanford, 52 Ill. 158 (1869).
7Madisonville, H. & E. R. Co. v. Cates, 138 Ky. 257 (1910).
8
Baker v. Town of Akron, 145 Ia. 485 (1910).
9
Matteson v. Tucker, 131 Ia. 511 (I9O6).
1Wagner v. Chaney, 19 Ill. App. 546 (1886); Bates v. Smith, OO Mass. I81
(1868); O'Connor v. The Fond du Lac, A. & P.R. Co., 52 Wis. 526 (i88i).
"Morrissey v. Chi., B. & Q. R. Co., 38 Neb. 4o6 (1893).
12Hall v. Rising, 141 Ala. 431 (1904); So. Ry. Co. v. Lewis, supra, note 5;
Larrabee v. Cloverdale, 131 Cal. 96 (1goo).
"Holman
v. Richardson, 112 Miss. 216 (1916).
4
" Luther v. Winnisimmet Co., 9 Cush. (Mass.) I7I (185i); Ashley v. Wolcott,
ii Cush. (Mass.) 192 (1853); Parks v. Newburyport, 1O Gray (Mass.) 28 (1857).
151o Allen (Mass.) 1O6 (1865).
"Supra, note 14.
'77 Allen (Mass.) 19 (1863).
1813 Gray (Mass.) 6o (1859).
"gSupra,note 14.
2°Supra,note I5.
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coming thereon or to cause it to pass off in a different direction and in
larger quantities than previously, and any injury thereby resulting to
adjoining land is damnum absque injuria.
At the same time that the case of Gannon v. Hargadonwas being
decided in Massachusetts, a similar question had arisen in New Jersey.
The latter court, in the case of Bowlsby v. Speer,21 quoted with
approval the dicta of the early Massachusetts cases, and also several
English cases.22 In none of these cases is the principal question
involved, but the proposition is laid down that the upper owner owes
no duty to the lower to maintain his land as a feeder of surface water
to the lower land. The cases do not decide whether the lower land
would be obliged to receive surface water in the natural course of
drainage. Bowlsby v. Speer holds that neither the retention, diversion, repulsion nor altered transmission of surface water is an actionable injury, even though damage ensues. This rule was adopted in
Town of Union v. Durkes,21 and there denominated the "common
enemy" doctrine, by which name it is generally known. Surface
water is a common enemy and every landed proprietor has a right to
take any measures to protect his property from its ravages, even if in
doing so he throws it back upon a coterminous proprietor to his
damage.2 The United States Supreme Court has declared this to
be the common law rule.2
Various modifications of the rule have been introduced. The
common law rule prevails in Kansas except in cases of hilly land with
ravines and gullies,26 where the rule of the civil law is applied under
the subterfuge that the ravine or gully constitutes a natural water
course bringing it within the common law rule as to running streams.
The rule of the common law imposes a serious burden on owners of
farm lands by permitting railroad embankments to be erected without
sufficient culverts, thereby casting back surface waters. 27 Missouri
has a statutory provision making the construction of railway embankments an exception to the common law rule.28
The facts in Chadeaynev. Robinson 9 are quite similar to those in the
Holman case. Connecticut follows the common law rule, and the
court there held that the lower proprietor had the right to erect for
the entire depth of his lot a structure which would form a barrier to
surface water. There is a tendency, however, in the application of
2131
22 N. J. L. 351 (1865).

Greatrex v. Hayward, 8 Exch. Rep. 291 (1853); Rawstron v. Taylor, ixI Id.
369 (1855); Broadbentv. Rathsbothan, ii Id. 6o2 (1856).
2138 N. J. L. 21 (1875).
24Benthal v. Seifert, 77 Ind. 302 (I881); Morrissey v. Chi., B. & Q. R. Co.,
supra, note II.
2Walker v. So..Pac. R. Co., 165 U. S. 592 (1897). New York has adopted the
common law rule. Barkley v. Wilcox, 86 N. Y. 140 (1881). But in Vanderwiele
v. Taylor, 65 N. Y. 341 (1875), where the plaintiff sought to recover damages for
injury to his building by surface water flowing from defendant's land on to his
own, it was held that the upper owner was under no duty to drain his land for the
benefit
of the lower owner, but might allow it to flow in its natural course.
2
Kansas City & Emp. R. Co. v. Riley, 33 Kan. 374 (1885); Palmer v. Waddell,
22 Kan. 352 (1879).
nTWalker v. So. Pac. R. Co., supra, note 25.
2
8Cox v. H. & St. J. R. Co., i74 Mo. 588 (1903).
2955 Conn. 345 (1887)..
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the common law rule to require reasonableness in the defendant's acts,
as Holman v. Richardsonrequires it in the civil law rule; unless guilty
do what is reasonof some act of negligence, the lower proprietor may
0
ably necessary to lawfully improve his property.
The Minnesota courts, after considerable vacillation, have adopted
South Dakota court in
a position somewhat like the decision of the
3
Thompson v. Andrews. Erhard v. Wagner holds that landowners
may within reasonable limits deepen natural waterways, but cannot
change the face of nature or turn surface waters out of their natural
course.
The drainage of surface waters is one of those legal problems the
solution of which apparently must work hardship. Both the civil
law and common law rules bring injury in their application. The
question is: Which is the lesser evil? The common law doctrine
grew up through decisions involving city lots, where the adoption of
the civil law rule would have prevented development and been contrary to sound public policy. On the other hand, the common law
rule is essentially selfish, permitting landowners to cast surface water
about as a "common enemy" to be gotten rid of regardless of injury
to others. Such a practice is inconsistent with the spirit of the
modem social order. Water must flow; it seems therefore that here
the natural law may most profitably be followed, with such reasonable
limitations as will not impose on either upper or lower proprietors too
onerous a burden.
Mary H. Donlon, '20.
Trade Unions: Persuading employees in non-union shop to join
union.-The Hitchman Coal & Coke Company operated its mine as a
non-union mine. Its employees were not bound to stay out of the
union, but each agreed that if he joined, his employment with the
company should cease. The United Mine Workers of America
resolved to unionize the mines in West Virginia, where the Hitchman
mine was located, lack of control over these mines having played a
large part in the failure of a recent strike in other fields. An organizer
was sent to the Hitchman mine to gecure-an agreement whereby only
union members should be employed. He interviewed miners and
held public meetings, attempting to induce the men to agree to join
the union. He intended to secure a number of such agreements, and
then have all the men so agreeing join and stop work at the same time,
with the object of securing the owners' consent to the unionizing of
the mine. The company sought an injunction against the officials
of the union. The United States Supreme Court, in HitchmanCoal&
Coke Company v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229 (piz7), upheld an injunction
on the ground that the defendant was inducing a breach of contract
which would result in irreparable injury to the plaintiff, and on the
further ground that the object which the defendants had in view
would not justify them in seeking to unionize the mine. Mr. Justice
Brandeis wrote a dissenting opinion in which Mr. Justice Holmes and
Mr. Justice Clarke concurred.

"0Arthur v. Glover,

82 Neb. 528 (i9o8).
31Io4 Minn. 258 (igo8).
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The majority .opinion rests the right to an injunction largely upon
the ground that a breach of contract was being induced. Not only
is this finding of fact questionable, but the court clearly indicates that
inducing the plaintiff's employees to join the union would be a wrong
regardless of contract if done with the intention of striking in the
future. Moreover, the court actually restrains the defendants from
persuading the plaintiff's employees to do what they had a clear right
to do; leave the plaintiff and join the union; and while it is intimated
that tortious means of persuasion had been used, the injunction goes
to any sort of persuasion.
In general, the furtherance of the defendant's own interest is
clearly a justification for an interference with the plaintiff's profitable
relations which involves no breach of contract and no independent
tort.' So it is that a storekeeper may hire his competitor's clerk or
attract his competitor's customers. The defendants in the principal
case had a very clear interest in the unionization of the plaintiff's mine.
Their personal interest would be served, since their salaries might be
raised and their power would certainly be increased through the
growth of the union; and in their capacities as representatives of the
United Mine- Workers .of America, they were interested in inducing
the plaintiff's employees to cease competing with the union. Their.
interest was as directly involved as is the interest of the user of
various legal methods of trade warfare. The defendants were seeking
to rid themselves,, in time of strike, of the competition of the very
persons they are attempting to persuade-the plaintiff's emhployees.
Certainly, the defendant's interest is as directly involved as in the case
of a boycott of materials produced in a non-union shop, where the men
refusing to handle the materials do not themselves desire the work of
producing them, and are not themselves competing with the non-2
union makers; a proceeding which was held lawful in Bossert v. Dhuy.
The defendant's interest is more directly concerned than the interest
of the boycotters in the ordinary secondary boycott; for in that case,
the boycotters are not competing at all with the men whom they
attempt to influence to refuse to deal with the person boycotted; yet
the modem tendency is to treat such a boycott as lawful where the
motive is the defendants' gain, and no tortious means of persuasion
are used.3 The defendants' interest is quite as direct in the principal
case as in the ordinary trade boycott, in which A, a trader, refuses to
trade with B if B deals with C; which is lawful by the great weight of
authority; 4 or as in the ordinary strike for the closed shop, which is
lawful in many states.5 The injunction in the principal case condemns conduct which is less open to criticism than the strike for the
dosed shop; for the discharge of no person is sought here, and it is
the interference with the rights of third persons, the non-union men,
which has led some courts to treat the strike for the closed shop as
illegal.
Furthermore, is it not strange that the law should (as it undoubtedly
1

Mogul S. S. Co. v. McGregor, L. R. [1892] App. Cas. 25.

2221 N. Y. 342 (1917).
3
4See 3 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 75.
Cote v. Murphy, i59 Pa. 42o (1894).
5

National Protective Ass'n. v. Cumming, 17o N. Y. 315
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does) treat the narrow self-interest of the defendant as superior to his
class interest, to the interest of a very large number of persons, in
furnishing a justification? It is very clear in the present case that the
interest of a large body of union miners, if not of all miners, would be
best served by the unionization of the plaintiff's mine. Should not
this be a justification far greater than any to be found in the selfinterest of a few private individuals?
The decision is unfortunate, especially because it leaves uncontradicted statements made in the court below that the union is an
illegal organization, and because it casts doubt upon the right of any
union to attempt to increase its membership if a strike is even remotely
contemplated. It seems to consider the technical rights of the
employer of greater importance than the right of the workmen to a
system of collective bargaining.
Richard H. Brown, 'i9.
Trusts: Spendthrift trust: Effect of acquisition of remainder by
beneficiary.-In the case of Bowlin v. Citizens NationalBank & Trust
Company, x98 S. W. (Ark.) 288 (1917), the appellants brought suit
against the appellee, as trustee for John Bowlin and Mattie Bowlin
for the purpose of terminating the trust and recovering the trust
funds. It appears that, by the last will of William Bowlin, a spendthrift trust was created in favor of the cestuis que trustentwho, having
acquired the interest of the remaindermen, claimed that, under the
doctrine of merger of estates and acceleration of remainders, the trust
should be declared terminated. The spendthrift character of the
trust was, however, held to prevent a merger and the legal and
equitable estates continued separate and distinct, although both
became vested in the sanie persons.
It is a well recognized principle of law that, when the legal and
equitable estates in trust property become united in one and the same
person, a merger will result, thereby extinguishing the trust.' In
such cases the theory is, that "a man cannot be trustee for himself,
at the same
nor hold the fee, which embraces the whole estate, and
'2
time hold the several parts separated from the whole."
Of course, in order that there be such a merger in any case, the two
estates must be comniensurate with each other, or the legal estate
must be the more extensive of the two. 3 If the cestui does not have
the legal estate, which by the terms of the trust is to exist during the
existence of the trust, there can be no merger of the trust estate in
that legal estate. On the other hand, if the trust estate of the cestui
were to merge in the legal estate in rem'inder this would destroy the
were destroyed there would be no estate left in
trust, and if the trust
4
the cestui to merge.
'Warner v. Spriggs, 62 Md. 14 (1883); Tilton v. Davidson, 98 Me. 55 (1903);
Weeks v. Frankel, 197 N. Y. 304 (19io); Dodson v. Ball, 6o Pa. St. 492 (1868);
Langley v. Conlan, 212 Mass. 135 (1912).
21 Perry on Trusts, sec. 347.
See also, Wills v. Cooper, i Dutch. (N. J.) 137
(1855); Bolles v. State Trust Co., 27 N. J. Eq. 3o8 (1876).
31 Perry on Trusts, see. 347, and the cases cited therein.
4Aschev. Asche, 113 N.Y. 232 (I889). AndseelnreMoore's Estate, I98 Pa. 6II
(1901).
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Moreover, equity does not always recognize the legal doctrine of the
merger, and, when it is clear that the trustor-that is, the creator of
the trust-intended the beneficial and the legal interests to remiain
separate and distinct, though they should meet in the same party,
there will be no merger.5
It seems that a line may be drawn between those cases in which the
legal and equitable estates have been said to be merged and those in
which they continue distinct, although the interests are vested in the
same party, thereby keeping the trust alive. Wherever there has
been a m'-rger effected, it would appear that the trustee had no active
duties to perform but was the holder of a bare, naked trust; that is, a
passive trust had been created,
in which the trustee is not bound to
6
perform any duty whatsoever.
Moreover, in New York, it would seem that, in view of section 103
of the Real Property Law and section 15 of the Personal Property Law.
which render the interest of a beneficiary in a trust to receive and
apply the income of property inalienable, thereis a further argument
for recognizing in the cestui of such a trust a separate equitable interest
despite the fact that
the beneficiary may have acquired a legal estate
7
in the property.
Olive J. Schmidt, 'i8.
Wills: Incorporation of extrinsic documents by reference.-It
might well be asked whether the rule permitting the incorporation of
extrinsic documents of a testamentary nature into a will has in any
way been modified by the late decision in Matter of Fowles, 222 N. Y.
222 (19x8).1
In this case the will of Charles Frederick Fowles, made
on April 29th, x91, by the eighth article gave his residuary estate to
trustees to divide into three parts, the first part to consist of forty-five
per cent. thereof, and each of the other parts to consist of twentyseven and one-half per cent. thereof. The income of the first part was
to be paid to his wife during her life, and upon her death the trust was
to cease and the corpus be divided. Half of the corpus was to be paid
by the trustees "pursuant to the provisions of such last will and testament as my said wife may leave (hereby conferring upon my said
wife the power to dispose of the said one-half by last will and testament duly executed by her)." If she failed to execute the power, the
corpus was to be held in trust for his daughters by a former wife, with
remainder to their children. To them also were given upon like
trusts, and with like remainders, the other shares of the residue.
The controversy grows out of the ninth article which reads as
follows: "In the event that my said wife and myself should die
simultaneously or under such circumstances as to render it impossible
or difficult to determine who predeceased the other, I hereby declare
it to be my will that it shall be deemed that I shall have predeceased
my said wife, and that this my will and any and all its provisions shall
5
Sherlock v. Thompson, 167 Iowa I (1914); Dale v. Guaranty Trust Co., 168
App.
Div.(N. Y.) 6oi (i915); Asche v. Asche, supra, note 4.
6

Warner v. Spriggs, supra, note I; Dodson v. Ball, supra, note i; Tilton v.
Davidson, supra, note i.
Dale v. Guaranty Trust Co., supra, note 5.
'Reversing 176 App. Div. (N. Y.) 637 (1917).
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be construed on the assumption and basis that I shall have predeceased my said wife."
Husband and wife were lost at sea on May 7th, 1915, with the
steamship "Lusitania". There is nothing to show who survived.
The wife left a will made at the same time as the husband's. She
recites the power of appointment and undertakes to execute it. She
gives her residuary estate (including the property affected by the
power) to trustees for the use of a sister during life with remainder
over.
Is this gift, in its application to the husband's estate, made valid
and effective by the ninth article of his will? This question was
answered affirmatively, Cardozo, J., writing the prevailing opinion.
Crane and McLaughlin, J.J., dissented, writing separate opinions.
In order to reach this result it was obviously necessary to read the
will left by the wife into that of her husband.
There is no presumption that one of two persons, who are lost in a
common disaster, survived the other.2 At the c vil law there were
various presumptions of survivorship based on age, strength, or sex.
This doctrine, recognized by a few early English cases,3 is still retained
in California and Louisiana by statute. 4 The testator clearly intended
to avoid the result of any presumption or lack of presumption by
inserting the ninth article into his will, and his directions should be
given effect providing they do not transgress any rule of law. It is
said that only one rule is supposed to stand in the way and that is that
wills must be executed in compliance with statutory formalities, and
are not to be enlarged or diminished by reference to extrinsic documents which may not be authentic.
The judicial precedents of most importance relied upon by the
court were Matter of Piffard5 and Condit v. DeHart6 In the former
case a testator by his last will gave to his daughter S,one-fifth of all
his real and personal property. By later codicil he gave her the power
to dispose by her will of this share of his estate and directed such share
to be paid to his daughter's executors or trustees, in the case of her
death in his lifetime. The court permitted her will to be referred to,
not as transferring the property by an appointment, but to define and
make certain the persons to whom, and the proportions in which the
one-fifth should pass by the father's will in case of the death of the
daughter in his lifetime. In Condit v. De Hart the testator by his will
devised his residuary estate to his son. By a codicil he afterwards
authorized his said son to dispose, by his will, of said residuary estate,
and then devised and bequeathed the same to such persons as his son
should designate and appoint by his will. The son died before the
testator, designating his wife as the person to whom the estate should
2
Newell v. Nichols, 75 N. Y. 78 (1878); St. John v. Andrews Institute, 191
N. Y. 254 (i9o8); Young Women's Christian Home v. French, 187 U. S. 401
(19o3); U. S. Casualty Company v. Kafer, 169 Mo. 301 (1902); 51 L. R. A. 863,
and cases there collected.
3Taylor v. Diplock, 2 Phillimore (Eng.) 261 (1815); In Matter of Selwyn, 3

Hagg.
Ec. (Eng.) 748 (1831).
4

Cal. Code of Civ. Proc., sec. 1963, sub. 40; Civil Code of La., arts. 936-939.

5i1 N. Y. 410 (1888).
662 N. J. L. 78 (1898).
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go. The son's wife was permitted to hold this estate as the devisee
of the father himself on the theory that the son's will although not
transferring the father's residuary estate by an appointment, could
be referred to for the purpose 6f ascertaining the person to whom the
estate passes by the father's will. It will be noticed that in the former
case there was an expression of an intent to make an independent
bequest and devise to the executors, in case of the death of the
legatee, to prevent a lapse. There is no doubt that this case went
about as far as possible, as, by reading in the daughter's will, it is
evident that a paper which not only described the beneficiaries but
also determined the proportions in which they should take, was
incorporated. Extrinsic documents not of a testamentary nature
may be referred to merely to aid in the identification of a person
described,7 and thus, it seems that the second of the two cases referred
to is the sounder in point of law. And where a testatrix devised all of
her property to whomever should, at her request, take care of her,
providing the person so selected should have a written instrument to
that effect, signed by her, it was held that a letter of request written
to her granddaughter after the execution of the will was properly
admitted in evidence for the purpose of identifying the devisee. 8
Nor does the law object to a reference to a map for identification
purposes.'
Frequently by refusing to incorporate outside papers into a will
great hardship will result, especially where it is clear that there is no
fraud or mistake. Nevertheless, to permit the incorporation of
future testamentary papers into a will merely by reference would
leave an unusual opportunity for fraud, and would often result in the
incorporation of non-authentic documents. It is unquebtionably the
law of this state that future papers of a testamentary character cannot
be incorporated into a will merely by reference. If the law was otherwise, it would allow a testator to reserve the power to make future
conditions by unattested instruments. In the case of Keil v. Hoehn, 0
husband and wife executed separatewills onthe same day. Thewife's
will provided that her property, real and personal, should go to her
husband for life, and "after his decease the real and personal estate
shall be divided as set down in the last will and testament of my husband." The testatrix was held to die intestate as to her residuary
estate, the court saying, "The provisions of.the will of Mathias [the
husband], in so far as they are referred to in the will of Anna Maria
[the wife], are dispositive in character; and it seems to be well
settled in this State that an extraneous paper or document of a testamentary nature referred to in a last will and testament cannot be
incorporated therein, unless it be attested and executed as a will." In
a much quoted case, memoranda of the various securities selected by
the testator for the payment of several legacies, signed by the testator,
were not given effect as an integral part of the will as it was clearly an
MDennis v. Holsapple, 148 Ind. 297 (1897); Hatheway v. Smith, 79 Conn. 506,
519 (19o7).

"Dennis
v. Holsapple, supra, note 7.
9
Tonnele v. Hall, 4 N. Y. 140 (1850).
1072 Misc.

(N.Y.) 255 (1911).
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unattested paper of a testamentary nature."
Nor can a testator
declare that any mere entry on his books, or other writing without
attestation according to statute, shall in itself have any effect upon
the provisions of his will. 2 The testator's whole will mustbe expressed
in his testament. 3
The general rule in this country is that, in order to incorporate an
outside paper into a will, the will itself must refer to such paper, (a) as
being in existence at the time of the execution of the will,14 (b) in such
a way as to reasonably identify such paper, 15 and (c) so as to leave no
question of the testator's intention to incorporate such instrument in
his will and to make it a part thereof." In the case of Newton v.
Seaman's Friend Society, Gray, C. J., tersely expresses the modem
American and English rule as follows: "If a will, executed and witnessed as required by statute, incorporates in itself by reference any
document or paper not so executed and witnessed, whether the paper
referred to be in the form of a will or codicil, or of a deed or indenture,
or of a mere list or memorandum, the paper so referred to, if it was in
existence at the time of the execution of the will, and is identified by
clear and satisfactory proof as the paper referred to therein, takes
effect as part of the will and should be admitted to probate as such."
It would seem therefore that by permitting the wife's will to be read
into that of her husband's, the court has gone beyond the rule supported by the great weight of authority, as her will is clearly of a dispositive character in so far as it affects her husband's estate, and was
not referred to as being in existence at the time the testator's will was
executed. However, other New York cases have previously ques-8
tioned the correctness of the rule of incorporation as generally stated.
Carlos Lazo, '8.
nBooth
v. Baptist Church, 126 N. Y. 21 5 , 248 (I89i).
12
Langdon v. Astor's Executors, 16 N. Y. 9 (1857).
3
' 4Langdon v. Astor's Executors, supra, note 12.
1 Brown v. Clark, 77 N. Y. 369 (1879); Newton v. Seaman's Friend Society,
I30 Mass. 91 (I881).

uSkinner v. American Bible Society, 92 Wis. 209 (1896); Brown v. Clark,
supra,note 14; Newton v. Society, etc., supra, note 14.
' 6Magoohan's Appeal, 117 Pa. St. 238 (1887); Young's Estate, 123 Cal. 337
(1899).

17Supra, note 14, at page 93.
18Matter of Emmons, 1o App. Div. (N. Y.) 701 (19o6); Booth v. Baptist
Church, supra,note ii; Matter of Will of O'Neil, 91 N. Y. 516 (1883).

